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Abstract
The quality of one’s social network significantly affects his economic success. Even after the skill
acquisition period, the social network influences economic success through various routes such as
mentoring, job searching, business connections, or information channeling. In this paper I propose
that a social network externality which extends beyond the education period – what I call a Life-
time Network Externality – is important in explaining the evolution of between-group inequality
in an economy. When the members of a group believe that the quality of their social network
will be better in the future, more young group members invest in skill achievement because they
expect higher returns on investment realized over the working period. As this is repeated in the
following generations, the quality of the group’s network improves over time. Combining the Life-
time Network Externality, which operates during the labor market phase of a worker’s career, with
the traditional concepts of peer and parental effects, which operate during the educational phase
(Loury 1977), I suggest a full dynamic picture of group inequality in an economy with multiple
social groups. I define a notion of Network Trap, wherein a disadvantaged group cannot improve
the quality of its network without a governmental intervention, and I explore the egalitarian poli-
cies to mobilize the group out of this trap. This social capital approach suggests a positive effect
of equality on economic growth in later stages of economic development and a positive effect of
inequality in the early stage of economic development, consistent with Galor and Zeira (1993).
Unlike the previous literature, the conclusion is derived without imposing the standard assump-
tion of credit market imperfections. Therefore, this implies that equality, by helping disadvantaged
groups to move out of the network trap, has a positive effect on economic development even in a ma-
tured economy without binding credit constraints, or in a society with public provision of schooling.
Keywords: Lifetime Network Externality, Group Inequality, Network Trap, Social Capital,
Economic Development.
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1 Introduction
The acquisition of human capital occurs within a social context, and can be facilitated by access to the
right social networks. This paper examines one mechanism by which such social network externalities
affect the evolution of economic inequality between social groups.1 The interaction between network
externalities during the education period and during the working period produces a unique dynamic
structure for the evolution of group inequality. The education period network externalities operate
as a historical force that restricts a group to be subject to the current network quality, while the
working period (or lifetime) network externalities operate as a mobilization force that leads a group to
enhance (or shrink) the skill investment activities by holding an optimistic (or pessimistic) view about
the future network quality. In the model to follow I identify what I will call the Network Trap, in
which the human capital development of a social group is trapped by the externality of social networks.
Also, I examine possible egalitarian policies to mobilize a disadvantaged group out of the trap and
improve its skill investment activities. Considering that human capital is a prime engine of economic
growth in the modern economy, I describe the macroeconomic effects of group inequality on economic
development (Loury 1981, Galor and Zeria 1993). The model I create finds a positive effect of equality
on the economic growth in most developmental stages. Unlike the previous literature, this conclusion
is derived without imposing the standard assumption of imperfect credit markets. Therefore, the
model implies a positive effect of equality even in an economy with no credit constraints: equality, a
more equal distribution of social network capital in this study, has a positive effect on the economic
development, by helping the disadvantaged groups to move out the network trap and enhance the skill
investment activities, even in the society with public provision of schooling.
Lifetime Network Externality
Socioeconomic disparities between social groups constitute a challenge in many countries around
the world. Even though social groups may educate their children within an identical educational
system and work in the same market economy, their skill achievement ratios and wage levels can be
significantly different. It is hard to conceive of a single root cause of inequality between groups since
the manner in which social groups are formed is unique to each society. For instance, groups form
along racial line in societies such as the Unites States, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, but
form along religious lines in Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Northern Ireland and Israel. While ethnicity is
1Another approach to explaining group inequality explores the discrimination story: either taste-based discrimination
(Becker 1957) or statistical discrimination through imperfect information (Arrow 1972, Phelps 1972 and Coate and
Loury 1993). This paper focuses on the social network externality not because discrimination is a less important issue,
but because the purpose of the work is to explore the dynamic structure of group inequality through the network
externalities. A companion paper (Kim and Loury 2008) explores the dynamic structure of group inequality due to
reputational externalities in the context of statistical discrimination.
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important in some countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, and the Balkan states, we often see caste-like
social division in India and Gypsies in Europe. In many western countries, the population is divided
into immigrants and non-immigrants, while population in the Americas is divided into indigenous
peoples and European descendants.2
Even though these cases are distinct from one another, a salient feature of the issue is consistent
throughout all the cases: divided social interactions between groups occurs over the whole lifetime.
The social network externality around the skill acquisition period and the consequent development
bias has long been discussed since the pioneering work of Loury (1977). In his theory, a human being is
socially situated in that familial and communal resources explicitly influence a person’s acquisition of
human capital through various routes, including the constraints of training resources, of nutritional and
medical provision, of after-school parenting, of peer effects, of role models, and even of the psychological
processes that shape one’s outlook on life.3 A number of subsequent theoretical works discussed the
development bias, emphasizing the network externalities over the skill acquisition period, including
Akerlof (1997), Lundberg and Startz (1998) and Bowles, Loury and Sethi (2007).4 However, the
theoretical work continues to confront some empirical evidence that it cannot fully embrace. Consider
a few examples:
1. Over the industrialization process of South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, the socioeconomic
disparity between Youngnam and Honam regional groups increased significantly, even when the
educational system was strictly based on the public provision of schooling, and when the familial
and communal environment did not carry a big difference between two regional groups: both
groups were in an early stage of development, poor and low skilled, and shared a similar cultural
base. It is often argued that social connections and mentoring networks played a key role in the
emergence of group disparity in South Korea (Ha 2007, Kim 2002).
2. In France, where the public school system is well established, the violence of second generation
immigrant youth in 2005 caused nearly 9,000 cars to be torched and dozens of buildings damaged
in a riot. Most of the rioters were unemployed youth who arguably suffered from social exclusion
2Also, groups have formed along linguistic lines in nations such as Canada, Switzerland, and South Africa (Anglo-
African and Afrikaners). Region of family origin influences the social interactions in nations such as Spain, the United
Kingdom, and South Korea (Youngnam, Honam).
3His theory is supported by numerous empirical work, which includes the peer influence (Anderson 1990), community
effects (Cutler and Glaeser 1997, Weinberg et al. 2004), racial network effect (Hoxby 2000, Hanusheck, Kain and Rivkin
2002) and academic peer effect (Kremer and Levy 2003, Zimmerman and Williams 2003).
4Akerlof (1997) provides a theoretical argument, which states that concerns for status and conformity are the primary
determinant of an individual’s educational attainment, child bearing, and law-breaking behavior. Lundberg and Startz
(1998) argue that group disparities in earnings can persist indefinitely when the average level of human capital in a
community affects the accumulation of human capital of the following generations. The recent work by Bowles, Loury
and Sethi (2007) shows how group disparity can persist in a highly segregated society, and how it can disappear as
integration is facilitated, in the presence of network externality over the skill acquisition period.
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in French society, and from the lack of a job network.
3. In his examination of the jobless black underclass in New York City, Waldinger (1996) concludes
that black unemployment originates from the lack of access to the ethnic networks through which
workers are recruited for jobs in construction and service industries.5
These examples illustrate the importance of social network externalities that operate beyond the edu-
cation period – what I am calling the Lifetime Network Externalities. This effect has been emphasized
in numerous empirical papers in the economics and sociology literature. The sociologist Granovetter
(1975) has been one of the pioneers of this line of inquiry. His work sheds light on the role played by
interpersonal relationships, such as friends and relatives, in channeling information about jobs and job
applications. He and other researchers have found that approximately fifty percent of all workers em-
ployed found their jobs on the basis of recommendation and word-of-mouth (Granovetter 1973, Myers
and Shultz 1951, Rees and Shultz 1970, Campbell and Marsden 1990).6 The role of ethnic networks
in job search is emphasized in numerous empirical work such as immigrants in Australia (Mahuteau
and Junankar 2008), Mexican immigrants in the US (Livingston 2006 and Munshi 2003) and migrants
to urban centers in India (Banerjee 1981, 1983).7 The effects of social network go beyond just finding
jobs. Friends and acquaintances of the same occupation may help workers to increase productivity
and decrease the psychological stress of maintaining the occupation. Empirical papers show that a
worker with richer social networks can be more efficient in contacting business partners (clients and
customers) and handling specific work troubles (Fafchamps and Minten 1999, Laband and Lentz 1995,
1999, Falk and Ichino 2005, Khwaja e al. 2008). The mentoring effects of the social network can help
to increases job satisfaction, to minimize the turnover rate (Rockoff 2008, Castilla 2005, Cardoso and
Winter-Ebmer 2007, Bilimoria et al. 2006), and to heighten the recognition of opportunities in the
5In the postwar era of New York, the manufacturing industries where the blacks occupied jobs moved out or eroded
while the job opportunities in the service sector continued to grow with whites moving out of the sector. The immigrants
who entered the low skilled service sector expanded their economic base through the ethnic networks, while the native
blacks left behind jobless. Given employers’ preference for hiring through networks, information about job openings rarely
penetrated outside the immigrant groups (Waldinger 1996). This empirical evidence brings a very different perspective
from the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain 1968, Raphael 1998, Ross 1998), which insists that blacks in central cities
lost jobs as employment moved to suburbs. The case in New York City reveals that blacks lost jobs even when whites
moved out leaving jobs for minorities in the cities.
6Other researchers concludes that, among many different job search methods, personal connection of friends or
relatives is most widely used among unemployed youth in the US (Holzer 1987,1988, and Blau and Robins 1990), and in
the UK (Gregg and Wadsworth 1996) and in Egypt (Assaad 1997, Wahba and Zenou 2005): Holzer (1988) finds 85.2% of
jobseekers used friends/relatives ties, 79.6% used direct application without referral, 53.8% used state agency, and 57.8%
used newspaper advertisement.In their study, the acceptance rate of job offers obtained through personal connection is
highest (eg. about 82 percent in Holzer (1988)), implying that job offers through personal connection generally have
higher wages or more appealing nonwage characteristics.
7Observing the evidence, Montgomery (1991) constructs a theoretical model that explains why firms hiring through
referral might earn higher profits and why workers who are well connected might fare better than poorly connected
workers. Montgomery (1992) suggests another interesting model in which the widespread use of employee referrals,
combined with a tendency to refer others within their own social network, might generate persistent inequality between
groups of workers.
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entrepreneurial process (Ozgen and Baron 2007). The empirical work suggests that the better the
quality of one’s social network, the higher the benefits one can expect, and, consequently, the more
incentive one has to invest in the acquisition of skills.
Dynamic Structure of Group Inequality
We conclude that both kinds of externalities – those operating during the education period and
those at work over the course of a worker’s lifetime – affect a social group’s overall skill investment
rate.8 As mentioned, this paper explores the dynamic structure of group inequality generated by the
interaction between these two types of network externalities. These two effects operate via different
channels. With the education period network externality, change in a group’s status tends to be
subject to the “past”: by altering skill investment cost, the current stock of network human capital
directly affects the investment rate in a newborn cohort. By contrast, with the lifetime network
externality, change in a group’s status tends to be subject to the “future”: by altering the future
benefits anticipated to accrue from skill acquisition, the expected success of one’s network influences
skill investment in an entering cohort.
This latter effect implies a unique feature of the dynamic structure: the possibility of workers acting
together to improve, or deteriorate, the quality of a group’s social network. For instance, suppose that
a group’s network quality is relatively poor, but that a newborn cohort happens to believe the quality
of group’s network will be better in the future. If this belief leads more newborn group members to
acquire skills, then the next newborn cohort will find the overall network quality has improved because
of the enhanced skill investment of the previous cohort. If the next newborn cohort, and the following
cohorts, continue to hold the optimistic view of the future, they will keep the enhanced skill investment
rate and the quality of group’s social network will improve over time thereby justifying the optimistic
beliefs of earlier cohorts. However, suppose that the newborn cohort held a pessimistic view that the
network quality will be even worse in the future. Fewer members of the newborn cohort will invest in
the skill achievement because the expected benefits have declined. As the following cohorts continue
to hold the pessimistic view, the network quality will be deteriorated over time. So, this pessimistic
belief could also be self-fulfilling.
However, collective action to influence such beliefs may not be feasible for all social groups with
unequal network quality. The potential impact of altering beliefs is restricted by the strength of
education period network externalities. That is, collective action through optimism or pessimism
cannot play any role when the quality of network is too good or too bad.9 Therefore, the analysis
8For example, when a group’s social network contains more highly skilled members, then more of its newborns will
invest in skills – not only because they have lower costs over the skill acquisition period, but also because they expect
greater benefits from a given skill investment to accrue over their lifetimes.
9Suppose that a group’s network quality is very poor. The newborn group members may consider enhancing the
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of the dynamic structure of network externalities focuses on the identification of the following two
ranges: (1) the network quality range mainly governed by the historical force of the education period
network externality, and (2) the network quality range mainly governed by themobilization force of the
lifetime network externality. The former is defined as deterministic range, and the latter as overlap, as
Krugman (1991) denotes in his argument for the relative importance of history and expectations. In
the dynamic system developed in this paper, there exists a unique equilibrium path in a deterministic
range, and there are two equilibrium paths available in an overlap in which a group’s expectation
toward the future determines the path to be taken.10 This insight is expanded to the multi-group
economy, defining notions of social consensus and folded overlap. In a folded overlap, two or more
equilibrium paths can exist. The path to be taken is determined by the social consensus, which is a
combination of groups’ expectations toward the future.11
An interesting feature of the multi-group economy is the existence of a network trap, where a social
group maintains a high skill investment rate, and another group is trapped by the “past,” that is, the
adverse effects of bad-quality education period network externality. To mobilize the disadvantaged
group out of the trap, two egalitarian policies are examined: integration and affirmative action. If the
disadvantaged group is a minority, the integration policy alone can save the group out of the trap. If
it is not, integration may cause both groups to fall down to the lower investment rates, as discussed
in Bowles et al. (2007). In this case, a combination of the two policy measures may help to solve the
problem.
Macroeconomic effects of Inequality
Finally, I examine the macroeconomic effects of group inequality. Since human capital has been
skill investment rate by holding the expectation that the group’s network quality will be improved over time and their
skill investment will be paid back in the future. However, they will realize very soon that the scenario would never
occur in the real world: the following generations cannot invest enough due to the serious adverse effects of poor quality
network externality over the education period, and, consequently, the network quality cannot be improved substantially
even in the far future. This is the situation of “the past” that traps the disadvantaged group. The opposite scenario is
plausible for the case of network quality that is too good. The newborn group members may consider lowering their skill
investment rate by holding a pessimistic expectation toward the future. However, they will soon realize that the scenario
would never occur because a sufficient number of following generations would continue to invest, due to the good quality
network externality over the education period.
10Adsera and Ray (1998) argue that overlap is generated only when agents can have an incentive to choose the option
that offers less appealing benefits at the moment of decision. In the example of Krugman (1991) regarding industry
specialization, overlap is generated because agents can have an incentive to choose the option that offers even loss at
the moving moment, because its cost is lower than the cost of moving in the future. In my model, the incentive is
originated by the nature of the overlapping generation structure. Since agents are given only one chance to choose their
occupational type at the early stage of their lives, they choose a type that gives less appealing benefits at the moment
of skill investment decision, expecting the average lifetime benefits accumulated in the future.
11For example, suppose a two-group economy. In a folded overlap with four equilibrium paths available, the economy
may evolve to the highest (lowest) level of development with both groups’ optimistic (pessimistic) expectations. If
one group holds an optimistic expectation and the other holds a pessimistic expectation, the economy will evolve to a
mediocre level of development with unequal distribution of wealth between two groups. By identifying folded overlaps
and deterministic ranges, we can analyze the dynamic process of the group inequality evolution: conditions under which
group disparities grow and conditions under which groups’ network qualities converge.
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the prime engine for economic growth in the modern economy, aggregate skill investment activities
can be directly interpreted as a stage of economic development. Thus far, most of the literature has
discussed the topic under the assumption of an imperfect credit market (Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira
1993, Benabou 1996, Durlauf 1996).12 This paper shows the positive effects of equality on economic
growth in most development stages, consistent with Galor and Zeira (1993), even without imposing
the assumption of an imperfect credit market. When social network capital, the average human
capital in one’s social network, is more equally distributed, more social groups can be encouraged
to develop their skill investment ratios, moving out of the network trap where they had fallen. It is
noteworthy that, contrary to the previous theoretical works (Galor and Moav 2004), equality of social
network capital can enhance the process of economic development even in the society with a perfect
public school system, or in well-developed countries where credit constraints are no longer binding for
human capital investment. In addition, this social capital approach demonstrates the positive effects
of inequality on economic growth in the early stage of economic development. In the early stage of
development, the concentration of social network capital to selective groups may help the economy
move out of the low skill investment steady state by giving opportunities for the groups to take the
collective action needed to improve their skill investment ratios.
Overall, the model is consistent with the empirical finding that income tends to be more equally
distributed in developed countries than in less developed countries, a phenomenon many economists,
including Kuznets (1955), tried to explain. By departing from the poor equal society with low skill
investment ratios, the economy may move to a more developed stage with some groups in the net-
work trap, where selective groups maintain high investment ratios while others continue the low skill
investment activities. Egalitarian policies can move the economy towards the high investment equal
society, in which all social groups participate in the high skill investment activities.
As an application of the dynamic network model, I address the regional group inequality issue that
emerged in South Korea during its industrialization process. Both Youngnam and Honam groups were
in the low investment steady state after the Korean War (1950-53). The Youngnam-based regime in
the 1960s through the 1970s helped the regional group to be more successful in an initial state-led
industrialization process and, consequently, to move into an overlap area, where the group was given
an advantaged position to exercise collective action to increase the group’s human capital investment
and build a better network quality. After rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 1970s and
1980s, Homan was identified as being in a network trap, where the group’s skill investment ratio
was significantly less than that of the Youngnam group. As the between-group social interactions
12Bowles et al. (2007) have successfully modeled the intergenerational human capital externalities without imposing
the imperfect credit market assumption.
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proceeded and the political power was transferred to Homan in the 1990s, younger members of the
Honam significantly enhanced their skill investment activities. Therefore, both the dominating position
of Youngnam group in the early stage of economic development, and the more equal distribution of
social network capital in the later stage of economic development, promoted the greater human capital
investment of the economy and the faster economic growth.
This paper is organized into the following sections: Section 2 describes the basic structure of
the model; Section 3 develops the dynamic model with network externalities and economic players’
forward-looking decision making; Section 4 provides an analysis on the homogeneous group economy;
Section 5 provides an analysis on the multiple group economy; Section 6 examines the egalitarian poli-
cies to mobilize disadvantaged groups out of the network trap; Section 7 examines the macroeconomic
effects of inequality; Section 8 presents an application of the dynamic model on the regional group
disparity in South Korea; and Section 9 contains the conclusion.
2 Basic Structure of the Model
The analysis in this paper focuses on the two-group economy because the most interesting features of
dynamic structure associated with social interactions between groups are contained in the two-group
economy. The way to extend to arbitrary n-group economy is discussed in Section 7.1. The two
social groups are denoted by group one and group two. Population shares are denoted by β1 and
β2 respectively with β1 + β2 ≡ 1. Suppose that there are two types of occupations, skilled or white
color jobs and unskilled or blue color jobs. Each agent decides whether to be a skilled worker or not
at his early days of life. Once he becomes a skilled worker, he lives as a skilled worker until he dies.
Otherwise, he lives as a unskilled worker until he dies. Let sit denote the fraction of skilled workers in
group i ∈ {1, 2} at time t, which is called group i skill level at time t. The fraction of skilled workers in
the overall population at time t is then s¯t ≡ β1s1t +β2s2t , which is a proxy of economic development as
the economic growth is largely attributed to the human capital accumulations in the modern economy
(Abramovitz 1993).
Let σit denote the fraction of skilled workers in the social network of an individual belonging to
group i ∈ {1, 2} at time t, which is called group i network quality at time t. This depends on the levels
of human capital in each of the two groups as well as the extent of segregation η: σit ≡ ηsit+(1− η)s¯t.
When η=1, σit is equal to s¯t for any group i, indicating that there is no difference in the network
quality across social groups. When η = 0, σit is equal to the skill level of group i (s
i
t), indicating the
total segregation across groups. Note that, with this structure, the number of total contacts by group
1 members of group 2 members equals that by group 2 members of group 1 members: (1− η)β2 times
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population share of group 1 (β1) equals (1− η)β1 times population share of group 2 (β2). The σit is a
convex combination of sit and s
j
t with their wights k
i and 1− ki,
σit ≡ kisit + (1− ki)sjt , where ki = η + (1− η)βi. (1)
The ki represents the degree of influence from its own group skill level and 1−ki represents that from
the other group’s skill level. It is noteworthy that ki is an increasing function of the societal segregation
level (η), and that of the population share of the group (βi): as the society is more segregated, its
own group skill level influence more on its network quality, and as the population size is bigger, the
network quality is less affected by the other group’s skill level.
Each newborn individual at time t makes a skill investment decision, comparing the cost of skill
acquisition with the expected benefits of investment. The cost to achieve skill at time t depends on the
innate ability a and the quality of social network at time t σit: C(a, σ
i
t) is an increasing function in both
arguments a and σit, which satisfies lima→0C(a, σit) =∞ and lima→∞C(a, σit) = 0 for any σit ∈ [0, 1].
The cost includes both mental and physical costs that are incurred for the skill achievement. The
lower one’s innate ability or the worse the quality of one’s social network, the more mentally stressful
the skill acquisition process is or the more materials he must spend for the achievement.
The expected benefits of investment to a newborn individual of group i born at time t, Πit ∈ (0,∞),
is the benefits of skill investment to be realized over the whole lifetime from time t until he dies, which
is the difference between the expected lifetime benefits of being skilled (Bis(t)) and that of being
unskilled (Biu(t)): Π
i
t ≡ Bis(t) − Biu(t). I rule out the high and low skill complementarity for the
reasons discussed below. Thus, both Bis(t) and B
i
u(t) are functions of the sequence of the expected
network quality from time t to infinite: {σiτ}∞τ=t, implying that Πit ≡ Π({σiτ}∞τ=t). Let us call Πit group
i benefits of investment at time t, because it depends on the group specific sequence of network quality.
The benefits reflect both psychological and material benefits, about which we will discuss in section
3.2.
With this setup, the education period network externality comes into C(a, σit) and lifetime network
externality comes into Π({σiτ}∞τ=t). A newborn individual of group i at time t will invest for the skill
achievement only when C(a, σit) is less than or equal to Π({σiτ}∞τ=t). Suppose that ability a ∈ (0,∞)
is distributed among newborn cohort in a S-shaped CDF function G(a): there exists aˆ such that
G′′(a) > 0,∀a ∈ (0, aˆ) and G′′(a) < 0, ∀a ∈ (aˆ,∞), implying that its PDF function is bell-shaped.
Suppose that G(a) is identical for all groups, consistent with Loury’s (2002) axiom of anti-essentialism.
We can find the threshold ability level for group i such that newborn individuals of group i whose
innate ability is at least the threshold invest in the skill acquisition.
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Lemma 1. Given {σit}t→∞, there exists a unique threshold ability level a˜it that satisfies C(a˜it, σit) =
Π({σiτ}∞τ=t).
Proof. This is derived from the fact that C(a, σt) is a decreasing function with respect to a that
satisfies lima→0C(a, σt) =∞ and lima→∞C(a, σt) = 0 for any σt ∈ [0, 1]. ¥
Let us define a function A which represents the unique threshold ability: a˜it ≡ A(σit,Πit). A is a
decreasing function with respect to both arguments σit and Π
i
t. Thus, the fraction of time t newborn
individuals of group i who invest in skill, denoted by xit, is expressed by
xit = 1−G(A(σit,Πit)). (2)
In developing the basic structure of this model, I am indebted to Bowles et al. (2007) for sug-
gesting the simplest way to encompass both the intergenerational network externality and the extent
of segregation. The smart representation of the newborn cohort’s decision making helps to reflect
the intergenerational network externality without imposing the assumption of credit market imperfec-
tions, which most previous theoretical work on the intergenerational dynamics relied on (Loury 1981,
Banerjee and Newman 1993, Galor and Zeira 1993). The so called (η, β) structure used in the paper
to represent the segregation level in a society enables the model to reflect the integration effects in
the simplest and the most effective way.13 Bowles et al., assuming the presence of education period
network externality, prove the instability of an equal society in a highly segregated economy combined
with the complementarity of high- and low-skill workers, as well as the instability of an unequal society
in a highly integrated economy.
My main departure from their model is the replacement of the two-period overlapping generational
structure with an infinite horizon structure. With this adjustment, we let the economic agents at the
decision moment of skill investment to consider the benefits of skill investment accrued over the entire
lifetime. Another departure is the assumption of exogenous wages: I rule out the high-low skill
complementarity, which was an essential part of Bowles et al., in order to concentrate on the net
effects of the two types of network externalities, education period and lifetime. The assumption of
no complementarity can arguably be accepted for the correct description of the modern economy,
where the human capital is considered the prime engine of economic development, due to skill-biased
technologies and international capital flow (Goldin and Katz 2001, Galor and Moav 2004). The wage
divergence between skilled and unskilled workers caused by trade openness and globalization does
support the exogenous wages in the modern world (Wood 1994, Richardson 1995). One important
13The η indicates the level of segregation in a society, and β indicates the population share of a disadvantaged group.
Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) is another paper that adopts the structure.
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departure is an introduction of the S-shaped G(a) function. With this specific functional form, which
is arguably the best way to reflect the innate ability distribution among a newborn cohort, I can
explicitly express the dynamic structure with network externalities in a heterogeneous group economy,
and explore the macroeconomic effects of inequality.
3 Dynamic Model with Network Externalities
In this section, I construct the dynamic system for the two-group economy, in which two types of
network externalities, education period and lifetime, play a crucial role in explaining the evolution of
group skill level sit and that of group benefits of investment Π
i
t.
3.1 Education Period Network Externality and Evolution of Group Skill Level
I assume that a worker is subject to the “poisson death process” with parameter α: in a unit period,
each individual faces α chances to die. We assume that the total population of each group is constant,
implying that the α fraction of a group’s population is replaced by newborn group members in a unit
period. Since xit is the fraction of newborn group members who invest in skill, the group i’s skill level
sit evolves in a short time interval ∆t in the following way:
sit+∆t ≈ α ∆t ·
(
xt + xt+∆t
2
)
+ (1− α∆t) · st.
By the rearrangement of the equation, we have
∆sit
∆t
≡ s
i
t+∆t − sit
∆t
≈ α
[
xit + x
i
t+∆t
2
− sit
]
.
Taking ∆t→ 0, we have the evolution rule of group skill level,
s˙it = α[x
i
t − sit]. (3)
There is a direct way to achieve the same result. We can define sit as s
i
t ≡
∫ t
−∞ αx
i
τe
−α(t−τ)dτ. Taking
a derivative with respect to time t, we have s˙t = α[xt − st]. The speed of group skill level change is
determined by the difference of the skill level of newborn cohort and the skill level of “old” cohorts. If
the fraction of newborn group members who invest in skill acquisition is greater than the fraction of
skilled workers in the group population, the group skill level improves. Otherwise, it declines. There is
no change in skill level, if the fraction of newborn members who invest in skill is equal to the group’s
current skill level. Combining this with the determination rule of xit in equation (2), we have the
11
evolution rule with education period network externality reflected,
s˙it = α[1−G(A(σit,Πit))− sit]. (4)
3.2 Lifetime Network Externality and Evolution of Group Benefits of Investment
As discussed earlier, we rule out the high and low skill complementarity. The expected benefits of
skill investment depends on the expected quality of the network in the future and the exogenous wage
levels for each type of worker. Let us assume the base level salary for a skilled worker (white-color
worker) is ws and that for an unskilled worker (blue-color worker) is wu. A skilled worker obtains
extra benefits from his social network, both psychological and material. The more skilled workers
he has in his network, the more appropriate job position he may find for his specific skills. He may
get more comfort and mentoring out of the informal network, and the cost for maintaining jobs may
decline. Information flows along the synapses of the social network. A skilled worker can be more
efficient in contracting his customers and handling specific work troubles with more skilled workers
in his network. Let Ss(σit) denote the extra benefits of having skilled workers in the social network
of a skilled worker from group i. Even an unskilled worker may obtain more benefits from having
more skilled workers in his network, but to a lesser degree than a skilled worker would get. Let Su(σit)
denote the extra benefits of having skilled workers in the social network of an unskilled worker from
group i. Both Ss(σit) and Su(σ
i
t) are increasing functions of σ
i
t. We assume that Sj(0) = 0, ∀j ∈ (s, u),
and ∂Ss
∂σit
> ∂Su
∂σit
, implying that a skilled worker would obtain higher marginal benefits for having an
additional skilled worker in his social network.
In the same way, an unskilled worker would obtain more extra benefits from having more unskilled
workers in his network. For example, a car mechanic would find a better car center that fits his
speciality when he has more mechanics in his network. He would be more efficient in handling a
specific mechanical problem when he can confer with more mechanics in his network. Since (1− σit)
represents the fraction of unskilled workers in the social network of worker from group i, let Uu(1−σit)
denote the extra benefits of having unskilled workers in the social network of an unskilled worker from
group i. Even a skilled worker would obtain more benefits from having more unskilled workers in his
network, but obviously to a lesser degree than an unskilled worker would get. In the previous example,
at least, he would find a better car center to fix his broken car when he has more mechanics in his
network. Let Us(1− σit) denote the extra benefits of having unskilled workers in the social network of
a skilled worker from group i. Both Uu(1−σit) and Us(1−σit) are increasing functions of (1−σit). We
assume that Uj(0) = 0, ∀j ∈ (s, u), and ∂Uu∂(1−σit) >
∂Us
∂(1−σit)
, implying that an unskilled worker would
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obtain higher marginal benefits than a skilled worker from having an additional unskilled worker in
his social network.
Suppose a worker discounts the benefits realized in the future with a discounting factor ρ. We
have assumed that each worker faces α chances to die in a unit period, under the poisson process.
Accordingly, given the sequence of the expected network quality from time t to infinity, {σiτ}∞τ=t, the
expected lifetime benefits of being skilled (Bis(t)) and that of being unskilled (B
i
u(t)) are
Bis(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[ws + Ss(σiτ ) + Us(1− σiτ )]e−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ,
Biu(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[wu + Su(σiτ ) + Uu(1− σiτ )]e−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ,
where ρ is a discounting factor and α is a poisson death rate. Since the expected benefits of investment
to a group i individual born at time t is Πit ≡ Bis(t)−Biu(t),
Πit =
∫ ∞
t
[ws − wu + Sh(σiτ )− Su(σiτ ) + Us(1− σiτ )− Uu(1− σiτ )]e−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ.
Replacing ws − wu with δ¯, and Sh(σiτ )− Su(σiτ ) + Us(1− σiτ )− Uu(1− σiτ ) with f(σit), we have
Πit =
∫ ∞
t
[δ¯ + f(σiτ )]e
−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ, (5)
where δ¯ indicates the base salary differential and, f(σiτ ) the difference between the extra benefits of
being skilled and that of being unskilled at time τ . Let us call δ¯ + f(σiτ ) time τ net benefits of being
skilled, which is an increasing function of σit because
∂Ss
∂σit
> ∂Su
∂σit
and ∂Uu
∂(1−σit)
> ∂Us
∂(1−σit)
. The more
skilled workers at time τ in a worker’s social network, the greater the net benefits of being skilled. I
assume that δ¯ + f(0) > 0, which implies that the base salary differential is big enough that the net
benefits of being skilled is always positive.
Taking the derivative with respect to time t, we have the evolution rule of the group i benefits of
investment Πit,
Π˙it = (ρ+ α)
[
Πit −
δ¯ + f(σit)
ρ+ α
]
. (6)
The change of the lifetime benefits of investment evaluated at time t is determined by the difference
between the current level of lifetime benefits of investment and the current level of net benefits of
being skilled. If the current level of net benefits of being skilled
(
δ¯+f(σit)
ρ+α
)
is greater than the current
lifetime benefits of investment (Πit), at the next time t+∆t, lifetime benefits of investment would be
smaller than the current level: Πit+∆t < Π
i
t. If they are equal to each other, there will be no change
in the expected lifetime benefits of investment.
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3.3 Dynamic System with Network Externalities
Thus far, we have examined how two variables, group skill level sit and group benefits of investment
Πit, evolve over time. The first variable indicates the fraction of skilled workers in the population of
group i. This is adjusted every minute by the fraction of skilled workers among the group i newborn
cohort. Thus, it is a flow variable, which cannot make a sudden jump at a point of time. The second
variable indicates the expected benefits of investment for a newborn individual of group i born at
time t, which is determined by the sequence of the expected network quality in the future, {στ}∞τ=t.
Since it depends on the expected network qualities, it can make a sudden jump at any point of time
by changing the expectation of {στ}∞τ=t. Thus, it is a jumping variable.
In the dynamic system that represents a two-group economy, there exist two flow variables, s1t and
s2t , and two jumping variables, Π
1
t and Π
2
t . Using equations (4) and (6), we can construct the following
dynamic system.14
Theorem 1 (Dynamic System). In a two-group economy, the dynamic system with two flow variables
s1t and s
2
t and two jumping variables Π
1
t and Π
2
t is summarized by the following four-variable differential
equations:
s˙t
1 = α
[
1−G(A(σ1t ,Π1t ))− s1t
]
s˙t
2 = α
[
1−G(A(σ2t ,Π2t ))− s2t
]
Π˙1t = (ρ+ α)
[
Π1t −
δ¯ + f(σ1t )
ρ+ α
]
Π˙2t = (ρ+ α)
[
Π2t −
δ¯ + f(σ2t )
ρ+ α
]
,
where
σ1t = k
1s1t + (1− k1)s2t , with k1 = η + (1− η)β1
σ2t = k
2s2t + (1− k2)s1t , with k2 = η + (1− η)β2.
4 Homogeneous Group Economy
The dynamic system in Theorem 1 is defined in a four-dimensional space of (s1, s2,Π1,Π2). It is hard
to have a clear imaginary view of the dynamic structure through the phase diagram, the direction
field, and the stationary points in this complex system. Even after succeeding in clarifying those
technical aspects, the intuitive interpretation of the system is a more challenging task. Let us start
14Refer to Section 7.1 for the expansion of this dynamic system to the arbitrary n-group economy.
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with a simplest structure of the economy, in which two social groups are fully integrated becoming a
homogeneous social group, or in which a social group is totally separated from all other social groups.
In the middle of the analysis of this homogeneous group economy, we define the essential concepts
to interpret the dynamic system with network externalities. In section 5, we will come back to the
two-group economy.
4.1 Steady States and Economically Stable States
Suppose a homogeneous social group or social groups in a fully integrated society, in which st = σt.
The skill level at time t directly represents the network quality at time t. The dynamic system is
simply
s˙t = α[1−G(A(st,Πt))− st]
Π˙t = (ρ+ α)
[
Πt − δ¯ + f(st)
ρ+ α
]
, (7)
and two demarcation loci (isoclines) of the time dependent variables are represented by
s˙t = 0 Locus : st = 1−G(A(st,Πt)) (8)
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt =
δ¯ + f(st)
ρ+ α
. (9)
In the demarcation locus for Π˙t, Πt is simply an increasing function of st, as denoted by a dotted
curve in Panel B of Figure 1. The demarcation locus for s˙t is represented by (st,Πt) that satisfies the
following two equations that are associated with the threshold ability level for the skill achievement:
st = 1−G(a˜)
a˜ = A(st,Πt).
The first one is denoted by the solid curve in Panel A of Figure 1 in (st, a˜) domain, which is simply a
S-shaped curve. The second one is denoted by the dotted curves for each level of Πt (iso-Π curves),
in the same panel. As Πt increases, the corresponding iso-Π curve moves down. (The curves tend to
be convex as the marginal impact of a network quality on the threshold ability level may decline as st
increases.) The combinations of (st,Πt) that satisfy the above two equations are represented by the
solid curve in Panel B of the figure, which is the demarcation locus for s˙t. Since we have achieved two
demarcation loci, we can identify steady states in this system.
Lemma 2. If there exist s′ and s′′, where s′ < s′′, that satisfy both s′ > 1 − G(A(s′, δ¯+f(s′)ρ+α )) and
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s′′ < 1−G(A(s′′, δ¯+f(s′′)ρ+α )), there are at least three steady states.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
Note that, as long as the the network externality in the skill acquisition period is strong enough
( ∂A∂st is big enough), the dotted curves in Panel A (iso-Π curves) are tangent to the S-shaped curve
(st = 1−G(a˜) curve) at two distinct points, (su, a˜u) with Πt = Πu and (sd, a˜d) with Πt = Πd, where
Πu > Πd. In the specific case with two tangent points, the multiple steady state condition in Lemma
2 is simply satisfied when Πu >
δ¯+f(su)
ρ+α and Πd <
δ¯+f(sd)
ρ+α , as you can observe in Panel B of Figure 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there exist three steady states when the condition of
Lemma 2 is satisfied.15 When the condition is not satisfied, it is most likely that there exists a unique
steady state.16 For example, if the base salary differential δ¯ is too big or too small, the Π˙t = 0 locus
will be placed too high or too low, and there is a unique intersection between the two loci. Whatever
the initial position s0 is, the group state will move toward the unique steady state.17 That is, if the
base salary for a skilled job is much greater (smaller) than that for an unskilled job, the group skill
level st converges to a high (low) skill steady state, regardless of the initial network quality. This is
certainly not an interesting case: the network externalities do not generate any difference in the final
economic outcome. Therefore, we will focus on the case with three steady states in this paper.
Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, there is a range of the base salary differential δ¯ ∈ (δ¯l, δ¯h),
with which there exists three distinct steady states in a homogenous group economy.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the dynamic system has two distinct salary differentials
δ¯l and δ¯h, with which the Π˙t = 0 locus is tangent to the s˙t = 0 locus in the (st,Πt) plane. Between
the two levels, there will be at least three steady states. Without loss of generality, there are three
steady states in the interval (δ¯l, δ¯h). ¥
Let us denote the three steady states by El(sl,Πl), Em(sm,Πm) and Eh(sh,Πh), where sl < sm <
sh. The final economic state (s,Π) will be on either one of them. In order to examine the conversing
process to a steady state, we need a phase diagram with direction arrows (laws of motion), which are
displayed in Figure 2. The characteristics of the steady states are summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Among three steady states, El(sl,Πl), Em(sm,Πm) and Eh(sh,Πh), El and Eh are saddle
points and Em is a source.
15There exist more than three steady states only for very peculiar functional forms of G, A or f .
16It is possible that there are only two steady states, for example, when the Π˙t = 0 locus is tangent to the s˙t = 0
locus. We ignore this case because it can occur with a measure zero probability.
17The unique steady state is a saddle point, which is easily proven as the same way for the proof of Lemma 3. The
economic state with an arbitrary s0 converges to the unique steady state following the saddle path.
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Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
We can identify the equilibrium path (saddle path) to each saddle point, El and Eh, as described
in Figure 2. In the given example of the figure, the equilibrium paths spiral out of a source Em.
Given an initial network quality s0 ∈ (0, 1), the newborn agents will calculate the expected benefits
of investment Π0. Based on the calculated Π0, each agent with different innate ability (a) makes his
own skill investment decision. In their calculation of Π0, they will use the evolution rules of st and Πt,
summarized in the formula (7). They understand that either Eh or El should be the final economic
state. If they believe that Eh will be realized in the future, they will choose Π0 on the equilibrium
path to Eh. As the following generations keep the same belief, the group state will be moving along
the equilibrium path, and eventually arrive at Eh. If they believe that El will be realized in the future,
they will choose Π0 on the equilibrium path to El. As the following generations keep the same belief,
the group state will move toward El along the path. Since there is no equilibrium path that converges
at Em, the newborn agents who understand the evolution rules of st and Πt will never choose Em as
the final group state. Choosing Eh is called sharing an optimistic social consensus, while choosing El
is called sharing a pessimistic social consensus.
Although all three steady states are mathematically unstable, two saddle points, El and Eh, are
“economically” stable in a sense that there exists a converging path to these states for any perturbation
at the states: rational economic agents who understand the dynamic system can take the saddle path
to lead the group back to the original state. However, the source Em is “economically” unstable,
because any small perturbation from the state will lead the group to move away from it: rational
economic agents will take either the optimistic path to Eh or the pessimistic path to El, because there
is no converging path to Em.
Definition 1 (Economically Stable States). A state (s′,Π′) is an economically stable state if there
exists a converging phase path to the state for any s in the neighborhood of s′. Otherwise, it is an
economically unstable state.
In the given economy with three steady states, El and Eh are economically stable states and Em
is an economically unstable state.
4.2 Overlap and Deterministic Ranges
Let the network quality eo denote the lower bound of the optimistic path to Eh, and the network
quality ep the upper bound of the pessimistic path to El. As shown in the example of Figure 2, there
exists a unique optimistic path for an initial network quality in the interval (ep, 1): if the initial network
quality is good enough, there is only one reasonable social consensus about the future, that is Eh, and
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the group state (st,Πt) will move toward the high skill equilibrium (sh,Πh) by self-fulfilling investment
activities. Also, there exists a unique pessimistic path for an initial network quality in the interval
(0, eo): if the initial network quality is poor enough, there is only one reasonable social consensus about
the future, that is El, and the group state (st,Πt) moves toward the low skill equilibrium (sl,Πl), by
the self-fulfilling investment activities. However, if the initial network quality is mediocre in (eo, ep),
there exist multiple social consensuses about the future, El and Eh, that are available to the group.
The final economic state depends on the social consensus that the newborn agents of the group choose.
If they and the following generations are optimistic, Eh will be realized in the end. If they all are
pessimistic, El will be realized in the end. Therefore, in the interval [eo, ep], the social consensus
determines the future, while the historical position determines the future outside the interval. We
denote [e0, ep] as overlap as Krugman (1991) denotes. We denote the ranges (0, ep) and (eo, 1) as
deterministic ranges as the macroeconomic literature denotes.
Proposition 2. In a homogeneous group economy with two economically stable states El and Eh,
there exists a positive range of overlap, [eo, ep], with eo < ep, where the social consensus about the
future determines the final economic state among El and Eh.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
Corollary 1. In a homogeneous group economy with two economically stable states El and Eh, the
deterministic range for Eh is (ep, 1), and the deterministic range for El is (0, eo), where eo < ep.
Proof. Since there exists a unique equilibrium path outside the overlap, both ranges (ep, 1) and (0, eo)
are deterministic ranges. Since ep is the upper bound of the pessimistic path toward El, (ep, 1) is a
deterministic range for Eh. Since eo is the lower bound of the optimistic path toward Eh, (0, eo) is a
deterministic range for El. ¥
4.3 Mobilization Force and Historical Force
There are two kinds of network externalities, education period and lifetime, that affect the structure
of the economy. In order to examine the direct effect from each network externality, we compare three
distinct cases: 1) lifetime network externality only 2) education period network externality only and
3) both education and lifetime network externalities.
Lifetime Network Externality Only: the Mobilization Force
Panel A of Figure 3 describes the first case: there exists very negligible peer effects or parental
effects together with perfect provision of public schooling or no credit constraints in the skill acquisition
period. Since there is almost no education period network externality, the iso-Π curves described in
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Panel A of Figure 1 is almost flat: ∂A(st,Πt)∂st ' 0, or a˜ ≡ A(Πt), ignoring the st term. Therefore, the
s˙t = 0 locus will be like a S-shaped curve that satisfies st = 1−G(A(Πt)). As you can observe in Panel
A of Figure 3, the overlap may to cover the whole range of network quality [0, 1].18 In this case, the
historical position of initial network quality s0 does not provide any constraint in the determination of
the final economic state. The final economic state entirely depends on the social consensus, regardless
of s0. (With the bigger discounting factor ρ, the overlap may not cover the whole range of network
quality [0, 1].19 Even in this case, the overlap range will be much greater than that in Panel C of
Figure 3.) In other words, skill investment activities of newborn agents tend to be subject to the
“future”: the expected benefits of skill acquisition that accrues over the lifetime.
Suppose the initial network quality is s0 ∈ (sl, sh). If the group members believe that the final
state is Eh instead of El, the future benefits anticipated to accrue from skill acquisition Π
op
0 are greater
than the current level of network benefits ( δ¯+f(s0)ρ+α ), and more newborns invest in skills. The group’s
network quality improves over time and the group state converges to (sh,Πh) along the optimistic
path, as displayed in Panel A of Figure 1. If they believe that the final state is El instead of Eh,
the future benefits anticipated to accrue from skill acquisition Πpe0 is smaller than the current level of
network benefits ( δ¯+f(s0)ρ+α ), and less newborns invest in skills. The group’s network quality deteriorates
and the group state converges to (sl,Πl). Therefore, the social consensus toward the future determines
the future. Group members can work together to improve the quality of the group’s social network
by sharing the optimistic social consensus, or to deteriorate the quality of the network by sharing the
pessimistic social consensus. This is what I call the mobilization force of network externalities.
Education Period Network Externality Only: the Historical Force
Panel B of Figure 3 describes the opposite regime, where there is no network externality over the
course of a worker’s lifetime. The benefits of skill acquisition is just the wage differential δ¯ at each
period, and the consequent lifetime benefits are δ¯ρ+α . In this case, the expectation toward the future
does not play any role because the benefits of skill acquisition is fixed. The skill investment activities
of newborns are subject to the “past”: the cost level to achieve the skill. If the initial network quality
is good, the cost for the skill achievement is low. Consequently, a large fraction of newborns invest
in skill. Then, the network quality in the next period is even better because of the enhanced skill
investment rate in the previous period. Thus, even more newborns invest in skill in the next period.
18In this case, another limit set exists, which is a loop located between the optimistic path and the pessimistic path.
If economic agents believe that the network quality will fluctuate forever, the group state will be on this loop. I rule out
this unique case in my study.
19Note that, the bigger ρ, the bigger Π˙t and the longer the vertical direction arrows in the phase diagram. As the
slopes of the saddle paths are steeper, the overlap may not cover the whole range of network quality [0, 1], and is limited
between [sl, sh].
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The network quality improves over time. If the initial network quality is poor, a small fraction of
newborns invest in skill. The next period network quality is even worse, and even less newborns invest
in skills. The network quality deteriorates over time.
The two examples are displayed in the Panel. If the initial network quality is bad, below sm, the
network quality converges to the low skill equilibrium El. If it is good, above sm, the network quality
converges to the high skill equilibrium Eh. Therefore, the final economic state entirely depends on
the history, an initial network quality of the group. This is what I call the historical force of network
externalities.
Both Lifetime and Education Period Network Externalities: Two Forces Combined
Panel C of the figure display how the two forces of network externalities are interwoven in the
dynamic structure of network quality evolution. The mobilization force of lifetime network externalities
is constrained by the historical force of education period network externalities. The overlap is the
network quality range mainly governed by the mobilization force, while the deterministic ranges are
the network quality ranges mainly governed by the historical force. In the overlap, the group can be
mobilized toward the high skill steady state Eh by sharing the optimistic view together, or toward the
low skill steady state El by sharing the pessimistic view together. Outside the overlap, it is the initial
historical position that determines the final state. If it is high (low) enough, the group status moves
toward the high (low) skill steady state.
4.4 Size of Overlap
In the previous sections, the importance of overlap has been emphasized. Whether the initial position
is in the overlap or outside the overlap determines whether the group members can work together to
change the future by sharing optimism (or pessimism). Outside the overlap, the future is determined
through a mechanical tatonnement process. The bigger size of overlap indicates the dynamic structure
that is more governed by the mobilization force or the power of collective action. It is worthwhile
to check how the overlap size is determined, because this is an indication of the relative power of
the mobilization force and the historical force. In order to make a comparative statics analysis, let
us simplify the given model using the linear functional forms of the cost function C(a, st) and the
benefits function f(st):
C(a, st) = ψ(a)− k1st (10)
f(st) = q0 + q1st, (11)
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where k1 represents the influence of education period network externality, and q1 the influence of
lifetime network externality. We further assume that the innate ability equals across the population:
a ≡ a¯. The newborn agents with the unique innate ability a¯ decide to invest when the benefits is
greater than the cost: if Πt > ψ(a¯)−k1st, xt = 1 and s˙ = α[1−st], and if Πt < ψ(a¯)−k1st, xt = 0 and
s˙ = α[0−st]. Therefore, the slanting part of the s˙ = 0 locus in Appendix Figure 1 is Πt = ψ(a¯)−k1st,
which is a demarcation line that sharply divides the evolution rule of s˙t. The demarcation locus for
Πt is Πt = δ¯+q0+q1stρ+α . In this simple system without hurting the essential structure of the economy, we
can explicitly find the optimistic and pessimistic paths and the relevant size of overlap.
Lemma 4. In the simple homogenous economy with equations (10) and (11) and the unique innate
ability level of a¯, the optimistic equilibrium path (sop,Πop) above two demarcation loci and the pes-
simistic equilibrium path (spe,Πpe) below two demarcation loci are
Πop =
q1
ρ+ 2α
sop +
(δ¯ + q0)(ρ+ 2α) + q1α
(ρ+ α)(ρ+ 2α)
Πpe =
q1
ρ+ 2α
spe +
δ¯ + q0
ρ+ α
.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
This linear equilibrium paths are described in Appendix Figure 1 with the corresponding de-
marcation loci. Using the calculated equilibrium paths and the slanting part of the s˙ = 0 locus
(Π = ψ(a¯)− k1s), we can obtain the overlap size L¯:
L =
α
(α+ ρ)(1 + (k1/q1)(ρ+ 2α))
. (12)
Using the outcomes, we have the following results that have deep economic implications.
Proposition 3. In a simple economy defined in Lemma 4, the bigger the relative influence of lifetime
network externality over education period network externality (the bigger q1/k1), the larger the size
of overlap. The less the economic agents discount the future (the smaller ρ), the larger the size of
overlap.
Proof. The first derivatives of equation (12) give the results. ¥
The first result implies that, when the lifetime network externality is relatively more influential,
the mobilization force of network externalities is stronger compared to their historical force; collective
action facilitated by the formation of social consensus can play a bigger role in the determination of
the final economic state. The lower discounting factor means the greater forward-looking decision
making of economic agents, which implies the expectation toward the future can play a bigger role in
21
the determination of the final outcome. This fact is reflected in the second result of the proposition.
5 Heterogeneous Group Economy
Now we come back to the two group economy summarized in the four variable dynamic system of
Theorem 1. We assume that the conditions in Lemmas 2 and 3 are applied to this economy, so that
there exist three steady states at skill levels sl, sm and sh in the fully integrated economy, or in each
group’s economy with social interactions fully separated between two groups. Note that there will
be no group disparity in the long run if there exists a unique steady state: whatever the initial skill
composition (s10, s
2
0) is, the economy state (s
1
t , s
2
t ) converges to the unique steady state as time goes
by. Therefore, there will no issue for the persistent group disparity through the channel of network
externalities in this case, and this is certainly not an interest in this study.
5.1 Heterogeneous Economy with Total Segregation
Let us start with the simplest case of the two group economy: fully separated social interactions
between two groups (η = 1), which can help us to have an intuition about the four dimension dynamic
structure of two group economy. The structure of this special case can be directly inferred from the
properties of the homogeneous economy because there are no interactions between the two. Using the
same definition of economically stable states in the homogeneous economy (Definition 1), a steady
state (s1′, s2′,Π1′,Π2′) is called an economically stable state if there exists a converging phase path
to the state in the neighborhood of (s1′, s2′). Obviously, there are nine steady states in this economy:
Qij(si, sj ,Πi,Πj) for i ∈ {l,m, h} and j ∈ {l,m, h}. Among them, the following four are economically
stable states: Qll(sl, sl,Πl,Πl), Qlh(sl, sh,Πl,Πh) Qhl(sh, sl,Πh,Πl) and Qhh(sh, sh,Πh,Πh). Those
are depicted with dark circles in (s1, s2) domain in Figure 4. The other five economically unstable
states are depicted with gray circles in the domain. Two separated dynamic structures are displayed
beside the domain in the figure. In an economically unstable state, any arbitrary shock to the position
may lead the economic state (s1t , s
2
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t ) to move away from it, while the economic state can come
back to the original steady state after any small shock in an economically stable state.
Since there are four economically stable states, a society with an initial skill composition (s10, s
2
0)
will move to either of them in the long run. Once a social consensus about the future is constructed in
the society, the economic state (s1t , s
2
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t ) will move to the future state of social consensus following
a unique converging path to the state. Let us check available social consensuses and corresponding
equilibrium paths for each initial skill composition (s10, s
2
0) in this totally segregated economy.
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5.1.1 Stable Manifolds and Manifold Ranges
First, regardless of the position of s20, group 1 with an initial skill level s
1
0 can move toward either the
skill level sl or sh following the same rule in the homogeneous economy. The optimistic path to sh is
available to the group with an initial skill position s10 ∈ [eo, 1] and the pessimistic path is available to
the group with an initial skill position s20 ∈ [0, ep]. Those available equilibrium paths are described in
Panel A of Figure 5: the available optimistic path in pink and the pessimistic path in blue. In the
interval (eo, ep), which is an overlap, both optimistic and pessimistic paths are available. The same is
true for group 2, as displayed in Panel B of the figure.
Therefore, when both s10 and s
2
0 are greater or equal to eo, the equilibrium path toQhh(sh, sh,Πh,Πh)
is available to the society. The unique converging path to Qhh is a combination of two optimistic equi-
librium paths, (s1t ,Π
1
t )op for group 1 and (s
2
t ,Π
2
t )op for group 2. In the same way, the equilibrium path
to Qll(sl, sl,Πl,Πl) is available when both s10 and s
2
0 are smaller or equal to ep. The unique converging
path to Qll is the combination of two pessimistic paths, (s1t ,Π
1
t )pe and (s
2
t ,Π
2
t )pe. The set of initial
positions (s10, s
2
0) where the converging path to Qhh is available is called Manifold Range for Qhh, and
colored in darker green in Panel C of Figure 3. The set of initial positions where the converging path
to Qll is available is called Manifold Range for Qll, and colored in lighter green in the same panel.
In the same way, we define the Manifold Ranges for Qhl and Qlh. The manifold range for Qhl is the
set of (s10, s
2
0)s with s
1 ≥ eo and s2 ≤ ep, and is described in lighter orange in Panel D. The Manifold
Range for Qlh is the set of (s10, s
2
0)s with s
1 ≤ ep and s2 ≥ eo, and is described in darker orange in the
panel.
In geometry, a collection of points on all converging paths to a limit set Q is defined as a stable
manifold to the limit set Q.20 Using the concept, we define the stable manifold to an economically
stable state Qij .
Definition 2 (Stable Manifold SMij). Stable manifold SMij is a collection of (s10, s
2
0,Π
1
0,Π
2
0)s that
converge to an economically stable state Qij in the dynamic system defined in Theorem 1:
SMij ≡ {(s10, s20,Π10,Π20) ∈ R4|(s1t , s2t ,Π1t ,Π2t )|(s10,s20,Π10,Π20) → Qij}.
The manifold range to Qij is redefined using the concept of stable manifold, which is just a
projection of the stable manifold to Qij to the (s1, s2) plane.
20A limit set in geometry is the state a dynamic system reaches after an infinite amount of time has passed, by either
going forward or backward in time.
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Definition 3 (Manifold Range Mij). Manifold range Mij is a collection of (s10, s
2
0)s in SMij:
Mij ≡ {(s10, s20) ∈ [0, 1]2|(s1t , s2t ,Π1t ,Π2t )|(s10,s20,Π10,Π20) → Qij}.
5.1.2 Folded Overlaps and Deterministic Ranges
All manifold ranges are put together in Panel E of Figure 5. There are nine distinct areas: all manifold
ranges are folded in the center square, two manifold ranges are folded in the rectangles surrounding
the center square, and a unique manifold range exists in each of the corner. In the center square,
where four manifold ranges are folded, four social consensuses about the future are available to the
members in the society: the consensus of Qhh, that of Qlh, that of Qhl and that of Qll. Depending on
the constructed social consensus, the economic state will move toward one of four economically stable
states along a unique converging path. The social consensus is a combination of the expectation to
group 1’s final state and that of group 2’s final state, as summarized in the following table.
Group 2 \ Group 1 Pessimistic Expectation Optimistic Expectation
Optimistic Expectation Qlh Qhh
Pessimistic Expectation Qll Qhl
If the initial skill composition (s10, s
2
0) is in one of four rectangles, where two social consensuses
are available, the expectation to one group’s final state is critical in the determination of the social
consensus about the future. For example, in the rectangle placed in the top middle, two manifold ranges
are folded, Mlh and Mhh, and two social consensus about the future are available: the consensus of
Qlh and that of Qhh. Group 2 will move toward sh regardless of social consensus, because only the
optimistic equilibrium path is available to the group: s2t → sh. Group 1’s expectation toward the
future is important in the determination of social consensus and in the consequent equilibrium path.
If group 1 holds an optimistic expectation toward the future, the economic state (s1t , s
2
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t ) will
converge to Qhh. Otherwise, it will converge to Qlh.
If an initial skill composition (s10, s
2
0) is in one of four corner areas, the economic state will converge
to the unique economically stable state (Qij) in the area. Social consensus about the future is fixed as
Qij among the rational economic agents. Thus, the expectation toward the future does not play any
critical role in the determination of the final state, but the location of the initial skill composition, so
called history, determines the final state. To clarify the distinct areas determined by manifold ranges,
I define a folded overlap where multiple manifold ranges are folded, and a deterministic range which
is covered by a unique manifold range.
Definition 4 (N-Folded Overlap). N-folded overlap of M1, M2, ... Mn is an overlapped area of those
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n manifold ranges, M1, M2, ... Mn.
Definition 5 (Deterministic Range). Deterministic range for Qij is the part of the manifold range
for Qij (Mij) that does not belong to any folded overlaps.
Therefore, the characteristics of the two group economy with social interactions fully segregated
between groups are summarized in the following way:
Proposition 4. In the two group economy with total segregation, the (s1, s2) domain is composed
of one four-folded overlap, four two-folded overlaps and four deterministic ranges. If the initial skill
composition (s10, s
2
0) is in the four-folded overlap, four final economic states are available, depending
on the social consensus about the future. If it is in a two-folded overlap, one group’s expectation
toward the future determines the final economic state among two possible destinations. If it is in a
deterministic range, the economic state converges to the unique economically stable state belonging to
the range.
5.2 Heterogeneous Economy in General
Now we turn to the two group economy with an arbitrary segregation level η. Concepts of stable
manifolds, manifold ranges, folded overlaps and deterministic ranges, defined in the previous section,
will be useful in the following analysis of the complex dynamic structure with arbitrary η.
5.2.1 Identifying Steady States
In order to proceed with the analysis of the dynamic system in Theorem 1, we first need to identify
the steady states that satisfy s˙1t = s˙
2
t = Π˙
1
t = Π˙
2
t = 0. Let (s
1∗∗, s2∗∗, σ1∗∗, σ2∗∗,Π1∗∗,Π2∗∗) denote a
steady state, where two sets, (s1, s2) and (σ1, σ2), are bijective with parameters η, β1 and β2.
First, let us identify “partial” steady states (si∗, σi∗,Πi∗)|sj which are (sit, σit,Πit)s that satisfies
both s˙it = Π˙
i
t = 0 and σt = k
isit + k
jsjt , given s
j
t . The following three equations characterize the set of
partial steady states (si∗, σi∗,Πi∗)|sj :
s˙i = 0 Condition : si∗ = 1−G(A(σi∗,Πi∗)) (13)
Π˙i = 0 Condition : Πi∗ =
δ¯ + f(σi∗)
ρ+ α
(14)
Clearing Condition : σi∗ = kisi∗ + (1− ki)sj . (15)
By equation (14), A(σi∗,Πi∗) is a function of σi∗. Let us denote A˜(σi∗) ≡ A(σi∗, δ¯+f(σi∗)ρ+α ). Panel A
of Figure 6 describes A˜(σi∗), which is a decreasing function and steeper than iso-Π curves A(σ,Π) at
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each point (σi∗,Πi∗).21 In the panel, I place si∗ = 1−G(a˜) locus together with A˜(σi∗) locus, sharing
the x-axis together. Note that A˜(σi∗) locus must pass through si∗ = 1−G(a˜) locus at three points of
si∗(σi∗), sl, sm and sh, because we have assumed three steady states (El, Em and Eh) in a homogeneous
economy. In Panel B, using two curves in Panel A, we can denote the set of (si∗, σi∗)s that satisfy both
equations (13) and (14), which is represented by si∗ = 1 −G(A˜(σi∗)) curve in Panel B.22 This curve
must pass through three symmetric points, (sl, sl), (sm, sm) and (sh, sh). Finally, given sj , (si∗, σi∗)
must satisfy the clearing condition in equation (15), which is represented by the slashed dotted line in
the panel. Thus, for given sj , three points colored in blue indicate the corresponding partial steady
states, which are intersections of the si∗ = 1−G(A˜(σi∗)) curve and the σi∗ = kisi∗ + (1− ki)sj line.
The second step is to collect all partial steady states (s1∗, σ1∗,Π1∗)|s2 , and (s2∗, σ2∗,Π2∗)|s1 , in
order to identify (global) steady states (s1∗∗, s2∗∗, σ1∗∗, σ2∗∗,Π1∗∗,Π2∗∗). Panel A of Figure 7 indicates
the former and Panel B of the figure indicates the latter. In the top figure of Panel A, the slashed
lines with different levels of s2 help to identify (s1∗, σ1∗) for each level of s2. Note that the slope of the
slashed line is k1. Consequently, all partial steady states are denoted by s1∗(s2) locus in the bottom
figure. In the same way, in the top figure of Panel B, the slashed lines with different levels of s1 help
to identify (s2∗, σ2∗) for each level of s1. The slope of the slashed line is 1
k2
. All partial steady states
are denoted by s2∗(s1) locus in the bottom figure of the panel. As we overlap the two partial steady
state curves, s1∗(s2) and s2∗(s1), finally we can identify the (global) steady states in Panel C. Note
that each partial steady state locus is characterized with, using equations (13), (14) and (15),
si∗(sj) Locus : si∗ = 1−G(A˜(kisi∗ + (1− ki)sj)),∀sj ∈ [0, 1]. (16)
The following proposition characterizes the (global) steady states.
Proposition 5. The (global) steady states (s1∗∗, s2∗∗) are a set of (s1, s2)s that satisfy the following
two equations:
s1∗∗ = 1−G(A˜(k1s1∗∗ + (1− k1)s2∗∗))
s2∗∗ = 1−G(A˜(k2s2∗∗ + (1− k2)s1∗∗)), (17)
where A˜(σ) ≡ A(σ, δ¯+f(σ)ρ+α ).
21 ∂A˜
∂σ
∣∣
σi∗(=
∂A
∂σ
∣∣
(σi∗,Πi∗) +
∂A
∂Π
|(σi∗,Πi∗) · ∂Π∂σ
∣∣
σi∗) <
∂A
∂σ
∣∣
(σi∗,Πi∗).
22Refer to two examples (σa, sa) and (σb, sb) illustrated in Panels A and B.
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5.2.2 Characteristics of Steady States
Let us denote four regions in the (s1, s2) plane by Regions 1, 2, 3 and 4 in clockwise order, which are
divided by one vertical line (s1 = sm) and one horizontal line (s2 = sm), and the left and top region
is denoted by region 1, as displayed in Panel C of Figure 7. In order to analyze the number of steady
states in each region, I impose the following assumption without hurting the essential structure of the
model.
Assumption 1 (Smoothing Condition). The function G(A˜(σ)) has one point of inflection as the
ability distribution G(a) has one point of inflection.
There must be at least one inflection point between σ = sl and σ = sh, because we have assumed
three steady states in a homogeneous economy. As graphics in Figure 7 manifest, the economic
structure cannot embed more than two steady states when the functionG(A˜(σ)) has no inflection point.
The assumption imposes the uniqueness of the inflection point. This assumption is achieved when the
curvature of the S-shaped G(a) function is strong enough that the curvature of the function A˜(σ) does
not distort the overall S-shape of G(A˜(σ)). This assumption helps the model to be more tractable
than the case of G(A˜(σ)) with multiple inflection points. We call this assumption smoothing condition,
because we rule out unnecessary local fluctuations of G(A˜(σ)) with imposing this assumption. The
assumption implies that there exists σˆ ∈ (sl, sh) such thatG(A˜(σ))′ is decreasing in [0, σˆ] and increasing
in [σˆ, 1]. Let us define a function Dj(si∗) as the unique sj given si∗ on the si∗(sj) locus , which is
Dj(si∗) ≡ A˜−1G−1(1−si∗)−kisi∗
1−ki , according to formula (16). Then, we have the following useful results.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, the si∗(sj) locus with η < 1 has one point of inflection, when the
locus is defined over the range of sj ∈ (−∞,∞): Dj(si∗) is concave with si∗ < 1 − G(A˜(σˆ)), and
convex with si∗ < 1−G(A˜(σˆ)).
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
The partial steady state loci are composed of a concave part and a convex part, regardless of η
and β1.
Lemma 6. As η declines, the partial steady state locus si∗(sj) tends to be flatter: the distance
|Dj(si∗)− si∗ | shrinks as η declines. The partial steady state locus si∗(sj) with the bigger βi is steeper
than that with the smaller βi: The bigger βi, the larger the distance |Dj(si∗)− si∗ | and the steeper the
slope
∣∣∣∂(Dj(si∗)−si∗)∂si∗ ∣∣∣.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
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The Dj(si∗) curve gets closer to the diagonal as η declines, which implies the si∗(sj) locus tends
to be flatter as η declines. The second one implies that, the bigger the size of the group, the more
distant the curve Dj(si∗) is from the diagonal and the steeper the curve is. Suppose group 1 is the
minority and group 2 is the majority. Figure 8 shows the two partial steady state loci, D2(s1∗) and
D1(s2∗), for each segregation level η. Note that the locus for group 2 is less sensitive to the change of
η because the population size of the group is bigger than group 1 (β1 < β2). From the above lemmas,
we have the following results in terms of the number of steady states.
Proposition 6. The total number of steady states decreases from nine to three as η declines from
one to zero, regardless of the population composition (β1, β2). Regardless of η and (β1, β2), there exist
three symmetric steady states, (sl, sl), (sm, sm) and (sh, sh). All other steady states are asymmetric.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
The network qualities (or skill levels) of two groups at a steady state vary depending on the location
of each steady state:
Corollary 2. Regardless of η < 1 and (β1, β2), there exists a unique steady state (sh, sh) in Region
2, and (sl, sl) in Region 4. Regardless of η < 1 and (β1, β2), any steady state (s1∗∗, s2∗∗, σ1∗∗, σ2∗∗)
in Region 1 satisfy sl < σ1∗∗(s1∗∗) < sm and sm < σ2∗∗(s2∗∗) < sh, and any steady state in Region 3
satisfy sm < σ1∗∗(s1∗∗) < sh and sl < σ2∗∗(s2∗∗) < sm.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
Therefore, we can conclude that two groups are equally better off if the economy state is on any
steady state in Regions 2 and 4. Group 2 is better off than group 1 on any steady state in Region 1
and group 1 is better off than group 2 on any steady state in Region 3. In order to analyze the welfare
implications of the model, we need to define the Pareto dominant (or inferior) steady state.
Definition 6 (Pareto Dominance). A steady state (s1, s2) is a strictly Pareto dominant steady state
if both s1 > s1′ and s2 > s2′ are satisfied for any other steady state (s1′, s2′).
Definition 7 (Pareto Inferiority). A steady state (s1, s2) is a strictly Pareto inferior steady state if
both s1 < s1′ and s2 < s2′ are satisfied for any other steady state (s1′, s2′).
With the definitions, we have the following result.
Corollary 3. Regardless of η < 1 and β1, (sh, sh) is a strictly Pareto dominant steady state and
(sl, sl) is a strictly Pareto inferior steady state.
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Proof. Because |Dj(si∗)− si∗| is monotonically decreasing as η declines (Lemma 6), both groups’ skill
levels become less than sh at any steady state with η < 1, except the fixed steady state (sh, sh). Also,
both groups’ skill levels become greater than sl at any steady state with η < 1, except the fixed steady
state (sl, sl). ¥
We adopt the following notation rule for the deeper analysis in the following sections.
Notation 1. When η = 1, each steady state (si, sj) is denoted by Qij for i, j ∈ {l,m, h}. As η
declines, each steady state is denoted by its original notation at η = 1.
Thus, when we have less than nine steady states, we can identify each steady state by following its
original name in the economy with η = 1. Note that the locations of the following three steady states
do not change with varying η or β: Qll, Qmm and Qhh. Other steady states continuously move as η
or β changes. Particulary, the locations of Qlh and Qhl are denoted by the following rule.
Notation 2. The skill levels of group 1 and group 2 at Qlh are denoted by (s′l, s
′
h) and the skill levels
of group 1 and group 2 at Qhl are denoted by (s′′h, s
′′
l ).
When η < 1, the followings should hold by corollary 2: s′l > sl, s
′
h < sh, s
′′
h < sh and s
′′
l > sl.
5.2.3 Demarcation Surfaces
The vector field (s˙1t , s˙
2
t , Π˙
1
t , Π˙
2
t ) is (0, 0, 0, 0) at each steady state identified in the previous section. At
any other state (s1t , s
2
t ,Π
1
t ,Π
2
t ), the vector field is identified by the state’s location in a four dimensional
Euclidian space E4. It is hard to observe the moving direction at each state because the four dimen-
sional space is not visible. Fortunately, the dynamic system in Theorem 1 implies each component of
the vector field can be displayed in a three dimensional Euclidian space E3, either in the (s1, s2,Π1)
coordinates or in the (s1, s2,Π1) coordinates. Therefore, we can identify the demarcation manifolds
in each three dimensional Euclidian space, which turn out to be two dimensional manifolds, surfaces:
s˙1t = 0 Surface : 1−G(A(σ1,Π1)) = s1 (18)
s˙2t = 0 Surface : 1−G(A(σ2,Π2)) = s2 (19)
Π˙1t = 0 Surface : Π
1 =
δ¯ + f(σ1)
ρ+ α
(20)
Π˙2t = 0 Surface : Π
2 =
δ¯ + f(σ2)
ρ+ α
. (21)
In the space above the s˙it = 0 surface, s
i
t increases over time and, in the space below the surface,
it decreases over time. In the space above the Π˙it = 0 surface, Π
i
t increases over time and, in the
space below the surface, it decreases over time. Therefore, when an initial steady state (s10, s
2
0,Π
1
0,Π
2
0)
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is identified to be in the above (below) s˙1t = 0 surface in the (s
1, s2,Π1) coordinates, s˙10 is positive
(negative). When the initial state is identified to be in the above (below) Π˙1t = 0 surface in the
(s1, s2,Π1) coordinates, Π˙10 is positive (negative). The same is true for s˙
2
0 and Π˙
2
0 in the (s
1, s2,Π2)
coordinates.
Figure 9 illustrates the s˙1t = 0 surface and the Π˙
1
t = 0 surface together in one (s
1, s2,Π1) coordi-
nates. The second pictures in the five panels show the sliced segments of the two surfaces for each level
of s2. The Π˙1t = 0 surface is captured with Π
1 = δ¯+f(σ
1)
ρ+α in the second picture of each panel. The sliced
segment of the surface in each panel is Π1 = δ¯+f(σ
1)
ρ+α with σ
1 ranging over [(1− k1)s2, k1+(1− k1)s2].
For example, in panel A with s2 = 1, σ1 ranges over [1 − k1, 1]. The segment of the s˙1 = 0 surface
should satisfy the following two conditions with s2 given:
a˜ = A(σ1,Π1)
1−G(a˜) = s1
Points that satisfy the first condition are depicted as dotted gray curves for different levels of Π1,
named by iso-Π curves, in the first picture of each panel. Points that satisfy the second condition are
depicted as a solid curve with the range of σ1 in [(1− k1)s2, k1+ (1− k1)s2] in the same picture. The
points that satisfy both conditions together constitute the segment of the surface given s2. This is
displayed in the second picture of each panel as a solid curve. Adding up all these segments for each
s2 in [0, 1], we can construct the Π˙1t = 0 surface and the s˙
1
t = 0 surface. Note that the intersections of
two segments given s2 are the partial steady states (s1∗, σ1∗,Π1∗)|s2 .
5.2.4 Economically Stable States and Stable Manifolds
Since we have identified steady states and the vector field (s˙1t , s˙
2
t , Π˙
1
t , Π˙
2
t ), we are ready to identify the
economically stable states.
Theorem 2. Regardless of η and (β1, β2), steady states Qll, Qhh, Qlh and Qhl are economically stable
states and all others are economically unstable states.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
Those economically stable states are illustrated in Figure 10 with dark circles. Since we do not
impose functional forms of G, A and f , we do not have the explicit form of steady states. Consequently,
we are not able to calculate eigenvalues for those steady states. However, it is possible to identify
eigenvalues at three symmetric steady states because they are fixed points. We can show that there
are two positive and two negative eigenvalues at steady states Qll and Qhh.
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Lemma 7. At the economically stable states Qll and Qhh, the solutions of the following equation
constitute eigenvalues, among which two are positive and two are negative:
[λ2 − Rλ+H] · [λ2 − (ηR+ (1− η)ρ)λ+ ηH− (1− η)α(α+ ρ)] = 0, (22)
where R = [−GA′σ + ρ]Qii and H = [−α(α+ ρ)(G′A′σ + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′]Qii.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
Knowing this result, without loss of generality, we assume that two positive eigenvalues and two
negative eigenvalues are at all economically stable states, because the dynamic structure of those
economically stable states are locally identical. As far as the four eigenvalues are distinct, we can
calculate the exact equilibrium path to each economically stable state in the neighborhood of the
state.
Corollary 4. Suppose four eigenvalues are distinct. The unique equilibrium path, given an initial skill
composition (s1(t0), s2(t0)) in the neighborhood of an economically stable state Qij(s1′, s2′,Π1′,Π2′), is

s1t
s2t
Π1t
Π2t
 =
W11eΛ1(t−t0)W−111
W21e
Λ1(t−t0)W−111


s1(t0)− s1′
s2(t0)− s2′
s1(t0)− s1′
s2(t0)− s2′
+

s1′
s2′
Π1′
Π2′
 (23)
, where Λ1 is a diagonal matrix containing two negative eigenvalues and B is a 4 × 4 matrix whose
column vectors are eigenvectors corresponding to two negative eigenvalues and two positive eigenvalues,
which is composed of four 2× 2 matrices Wijs, B =
W11 W12
W21 W22
.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix. ¥
The set of these equilibrium paths are stable manifold in the neighborhood of the state. The stable
manifold theorem helps us to understand the shape of the stable manifold.
Corollary 5. By the virtue of the Stable Manifold Theorem, the stable manifold to an economically
stable state Qij(s1′, s2′,Π1′,Π2′) is two dimensional and is tangent to the stable subspace ES of the
linearized differential system at Qij. Suppose four eigenvalues are distinct. The stable subspace ES is
represented by the following two planes:
ES :
Π1t
Π2t
 = [W21][W11]−1
s1t − s1′
s2t − s2′
−
Π1′
Π2′
 , (24)
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where the first plane is determined in the (s1, s2,Π1) coordinates and the second one in the (s1, s2,Π2)
coordinates.
Proof. The stable manifold theorem manifests that if the linearized dynamic system at an economically
stable state Qij has two eigenvalues with negative real parts and two eigenvalues with positive real
parts, a stable manifold SMij is two dimensional, which is tangent to the stable subspace ES of the
linearized differential system at Qij . In Lemma 7, we have presented the characteristics of eigenvalues
at any economically stable state. The stable subspace ES is derived from Corollary 4. ¥
Therefore, we can infer that the stable manifold, which is two dimensional in a four dimensional
Euclidian space E4, is the combination of two surfaces, one which is identified in the (s1, s2,Π1)
coordinates, and the other is identified in the (s1, s2,Π2) coordinates. The part of the stable manifold
to the stable state Qlh is illustrated with blue and red curves in Figure 10. In the sliced phase spaces
in the figure, we can check the relative position of the stable manifold with respect to demarcation
surfaces of the time dependent variables (the s˙i = 0 surface and the Π˙i = 0 surface). In Panel B
of Figure 11, I display the full picture of the stable manifold with the blue and red curves, which is
a combination of two surfaces. The blue surface indicates Π1 on the stable manifold given (s1, s2).
The red surface indicates Π2 on the stable manifold given (s1, s2). The manifold range (Mlh), which
is a projection of stable manifold SMlh to the (s1, s2) plane, is depicted in orange color in Panel A
of the figure, together with the blue and red curves. Panel C of the figure displays manifold ranges
of all economically stable states and their overlapped areas. In the middle, we have a four-folded
overlap, and there are two-folded overlaps surrounding that. We can observe tiny areas of three-folded
overlaps.
The number of stable states decreases from four to two as η declines. The manifold ranges and
their overlapped areas are depicted for each level of η in Figure 12. Two manifold rangesMlh andMhl
disappear at some level of η, as the two stable states disappear. Two manifold ranges Mll and Mhh
tend to expand as η declines, while the other two manifold ranges Mlh and Mhl tend to shrink as it
declines. All manifold ranges are greater when the lifetime network externalities are more influential,
as the size of overlap is greater with the stronger lifetime network externalities in a homogeneous
economy (Proposition 3).
Proposition 7. As η declines, the manifold ranges Mll and Mhh tend to expand, while the manifold
ranges Mlh and Mhl tend to shrink. All manifold ranges tend to expand with the stronger lifetime
network externalities (greater f ′(σ)).
Proof. The first argument is obvious when we look at the case with no lifetime externalities f(σ)′ =
0. In this case, manifold ranges are not overlapped at all, as illustrated in Appendix Figure 2.
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Each manifold range is a basin of attraction for an attractor (economically stable state). The basins
are separated by separatrices that are connecting saddle points (economically unstable states). As
economically unstable states get closer to the diagonal with the declined η (Lemma 6), the basins
for economically unstable states should be shrinking. This analysis for the special case of f ′(σ) = 0
is directly applied to the general case, because the only difference is bigger manifold ranges with
greater lifetime externalities (positive f ′(σ)). The second argument is true because the size of overlap
in a homogeneous economy is analogous to the folded overlaps in a heterogeneous economy. When
f ′(σ) = 0, there is no overlap in a homogeneous economy, and no folded overlap in a heterogeneous
economy. With greater f ′(σ), they get larger, as Propostion 3 proves. ¥
5.3 Social Consensus and Network Trap
In the given economy, a maximum of four economically stable states exist. In Qhh (Qll), both groups’
skill levels and network qualities are sh (sl). In Qlh, group 1’s skill level and network quality are
below sm, while group 2’s skill level and network quality are above sm, according to Corollary 2. In
Qhl, we have the opposite result. Social consensus plays a critical role in the determination of the
final destination of the economy. If optimism prevails and newborn members believe in the better
network quality of the future, they are encouraged to invest more, expecting the higher benefits of
investment to accrue over their lifetimes. If pessimism prevails and newborn members believe that
network quality of the future gets worse, they are discouraged to invest, due to the declined expected
benefits of investment. The social consensus about the future should be one of the above four stable
states, because any other state is not stable and thus cannot be the final destination. In the analysis
of the model, I propose that members in a society can agree to a social consensus within a reasonably
short time period.
Suppose the society is located in a four-folded overlap. The society faces four possible destinations.
The final destination is determined by the belief of members in the society. If both group members
are optimistic about the future, Qhh will be realized. If both are pessimistic about the future, Qll will
be realized. If newborn members of group 1 are pessimistic about the group’s network quality and
newborn members of group 2 are optimistic about the group’s network quality, the social consensus
about the future will be formed as Qlh. The economic state (s1t , s
2
t ) will move toward the final
destination Qlh gradually. In the same way, if the social consensus is formed with group 1’s optimism
and group 2’s pessimism, the state will move toward Qhl. Thus, the society can be mobilized to
any stable state depending on the chosen social consensus: the mobilization force of lifetime network
externalities strongly influence in this economy.
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Suppose the society is located in a two-folded overlap: for example, an overlap of Mhh and Mlh,
in which group 2’s network quality is relatively better than group 1’s network quality. Newborns of
group 2 will keep the optimistic view toward the group’s future because the following generations
will maintain the high investment rate, due to the good quality of network externalities over the
education period. Thus, there are two social consensuses available to the members in the society: Qhh
and Qlh.. If newborn members of group 1 share the optimistic view toward the group’s future, the
social consensus will be formed as Qhh instead of Qlh. The skill investment rate of group 1 will be
enhanced significantly and the economic state (s1t , s
2
t ) will move toward Qhh. If they are pessimistic,
the skill investment rate of group 1 will deteriorate over time and the economic state will move toward
Qlh. Thus, group 1’s expectation toward the future determines the social consensus about the future,
and strongly affects the skill investment pattern of group 1 newborns. The mobilization force of the
lifetime network externalities influences group’1 future, while the historical force of the education
period externalities influences group 2’s skill investment.
When an initial economic state is in a deterministic range, “rational” group members understand
that there is only one possible future. The social consensus will be quickly formed, and the economic
state will move toward the stable state gradually. Among four deterministic ranges, two of them
lead the economic state (s1t , s
2
t ) to an asymmetric steady state. If an initial economic state is in one
of those ranges, “rational” newborns of one group will share a pessimistic view toward the group’s
future, while “rational” newborns of the other group will share an optimistic view toward the group’s
future. Envision a society in a deterministic range for Qlh. The current network quality of group 1 is
so poor that there is no way to recover the skill investment rate of the group, while that of group 2 is
so good that newborn members can maintain the high skill investment rate, benefiting from the good
quality education period network externalities. Thus, the historical force of education period network
externalities determines the future.
In many societies around the world, the economic state of the society is at an asymmetric stable
state belonging to a deterministic range: for example, either Qlh or Qhl in a two group economy. At
this state, a disadvantaged group cannot be mobilized to improve its skill investment rate, because
the network externalities over the skill acquisition period have a strong adverse effect on the cost of
skill achievement. This is a case where a social group is trapped by the network externalities.
Definition 8 (Network Trap). Qlh (Qhl) is called a network trap of group 1 (group 2) if it belongs
to a deterministic range.
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6 Egalitarian Policies in Network Trap
In this section, we discuss the egalitarian policies in a society placed in a network trap. Suppose
that the economic state (s1, s2) is at Qlh in a deterministic range, as Panel B of Figure 12 illustrates.
Group 1 is disadvantaged in the social network structure. The skill disparity between two groups
will persist indefinitely, without any governmental intervention or a structural change of the economy.
Since Qhh is a Pareto dominant state, the government has an incentive to pursue egalitarian policies to
mobilize the society toward the equality of his skills. We analyze two kinds of egalitarian policies, the
integration between groups and the implementation of affirmative actions such as quota and training
subsidies. Then, we will discuss the way to implement an effective policy for the different sizes of the
disadvantaged group. In the end, we emphasize the importance of good leadership of the disadvantaged
group in the mobilization out of the trap: encouragement of optimism and fostering of within-group
cooperation.23
6.1 Integration Effect
Imagine a society in a network trap of group 1, Qlh. First, note that the asymmetric stable state
disappears as integration is facilitated. The threshold level of the segregation level ηˆ depends on the
population size of the disadvantaged group: ηˆ ≡ ηˆ(β1). The following Lemma summarizes the shape
of the function ηˆ(β1).
Lemma 8. There exists βˆ such that ηˆ(β1) is strictly decreasing in (0, βˆ) and strictly increasing in
(βˆ, 1).
Note that, as integration proceeds, either Qlh and Qmh are merged together or Qlh and Qlm are
merged together, before Qlh disappears. Therefore, before the steady state Qlh disappears, the state
must get into either Mhh or Mll or both, because the manifold range Mhh (Mll) always covers the
unstable state Qmh (Qlm) as far as η 6= 1. With this fact integrated with the above Lemma, we have
the full picture of the integration effect, which is summarized in Figure 13. In the diagram, η∗(β1)
indicates the threshold level of η for Qlh’s entering Mhh. Note that η∗(β1) > ηˆ(β1) with β1 ∈ (0, βˆ).
η∗∗(β1) indicates the threshold level of η for Qlh’s entering Mll. Note that η∗∗(β1) > ηˆ(β1) with
β ∈ (βˆ, 1). Let us denote β∗ with which η∗(β1) = ηˆ(β1), and β∗∗ with which η∗∗(β1) = ηˆ(β1), where
β∗ > β∗∗, as displayed in the figure. As far as both groups are optimistic rather then pessimistic, the
integration can lead the society to the pareto dominant Qhh when β1 is in (0, β∗), because Qlh will
23This is what civic leaders, civic organizations, and religious groups can contribute for a more egalitarian society. In
US history, many civil rights activists and organizations including Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and the National Urban
League contributed to the improvement of the black community.
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move into the manifold range Mhh before its disappearance. However, if β1 > β∗, the integration will
lead to the manifold range Mll and the society may fall down to Qll as Qlh disappears.
Proposition 8. Suppose members in the society are optimistic rather than pessimistic. As integration
proceeds, the economic state moves to the pareto dominant state Qhh with β1 ∈ (0, β∗), and it moves
to the pareto inferior state Qll with β1 ∈ (β∗, 1).
However, if members in the society are pessimistic rather optimistic, they may tend to choose
Qll rather than Qhh for their social consensus about the future, when the economic state is in the
overlap of Mll and Mhh. They would tend to stay at Qlh rather than moving toward Qhh, when the
equilibrium path to Qhh is feasible. In this pessimistic society, integration will lead both groups to
fall down to Qll as far as β1 > β∗∗, as Figure 13 illustrates.
Corollary 6. Suppose members in the society are pessimistic rather than optimistic. As integration
proceeds, the economic state moves to the pareto dominant state Qhh with β1 ∈ (0, β∗∗), and it moves
to the pareto inferior state Qll with β1 ∈ (β∗∗, 1).
In either situation, integration has an adverse effect for the welfare improvement when the popu-
lation size of the disadvantaged group is relatively big. In this case, we should consider other policy
tools together with the integration for the effective implementation of egalitarian policies.
6.2 Affirmative Action Policies
We consider two types of affirmative action policies: training subsidies and quota system. First,
consider the training subsidy policy. Government can impose some taxes on the advantaged group
(or skilled workers in general) and transfer the resources to the disadvantaged group (or unskilled
workers in general) for the purpose of the enhanced skill investments. This policy targets decreasing
the education cost for the disadvantaged group, while increasing the cost for the advantaged group.
For simplicity, suppose that the policy is implemented in a way that all members of the disadvantaged
group experience a certain amount of cost decrease for skill acquisition and those of the advantaged
group experience a certain amount of cost increase for its acquisition. This effect is well reflected
by the shifted-up Π˙1t = 0 surface and the shifted-down Π˙
2
t = 0 surface, because the cost increase
(decrease) has the exactly same impact with the increased (decreased) benefits of investment on each
individual’s decision making process, which is a simple cost-benefits comparison in the model. If then,
as Figure 9 shows, the shift-up of the Π˙1t = 0 surface leads the shift-down of the D
2(s1∗) curve, and
the shift-down of the Π˙2t = 0 surface leads the shift-up of the D
2(s1∗) curve (or the shift-to-right in
(s1, s2) plane). This impact is summarized in Panel A of Figure 14. As the curves shift enough, the
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steady state Qlh, which was a network trap of group 1, moves into the manifold range of Qhh. Thus,
by overturning the social consensus from Qlh to Qhh, the economic state can move toward a high skill
symmetric state.
Quota policy places some group 1 members, who are unskilled, into skilled job positions that
otherwise would go to skilled members of group 2. Suppose the current economic state is Qlh(s′l, s
′
h).
The skilled job positions are fixed as s¯ = β1s′1 + β2s′h in this economy. The government intervenes to
mitigate the skilled job disparity between two groups, |s2 − s1|. The higher fraction of group 1 take
the skilled job positions, and the lesser fraction of group 2 takes the skilled job positions under the
constraint of s¯ = β1s′1 + β2s′h. If this external intervention can lead the economic state (s
1, s2) into
the manifold range Mhh, the society will start to move toward the high skill symmetric state. More
of group 1 newborns will be motivated to invest in skill acquisition, by sharing the optimistic view
about the future. This process is displayed in Panel B of Figure 14.
With the imposition of affirmative actions, members of group 2 may suffer temporarily, but the
group state will improve in the end: both the group’s skill level and the network quality will approach
sh, which is greater than s′h. The effectiveness of affirmative action is restricted by the size of the
disadvantaged group. As it increases in size, the stronger action is required to mobilize the disadvan-
taged group out of the trap. If it is too big, there might be no way to implement effective affirmative
policies to make society equal.
6.3 Policy Implementation
As discussed earlier, the population size of the disadvantaged group is critical for the effective im-
plementation of the egalitarian policies. If it is small enough, any one type of policy may solve the
problem (Proposition 8). This is depicted in the Panel As of Figure 15. The state X in Panel A1 of
the figure indicates the original economic state, which is a network trap of group 1. As integration
proceeds, X moves to X’ in Panel A2, which belongs to the manifold rangeMhh. With the overturn of
social consensus, the economic state starts to move toward Qhh. If the integration policy is difficult to
implement due to the rigid division of social interactions, other affirmative action policies can handle
the problem. A quota way is illustrated in Panel A1: the state (s1, s2) is relocated to Z ′ inMhh by the
quota implementation, and moves toward Qhh as social consensus overturns from Qlh to Qhh. (The
training subsidy strategy is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 14.)
However, if the population size of group 1 is too big, there is be no way for any type of policy to
improve the situation. This is depicted in the Panel Bs of Figure 15. The integration alone will lead
the original economic state X in Panel B1 to the pareto inferior state X ′′ in Panel B3. A quota way
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alone cannot solve the problem as illustrated in Panel B1: the straight line constraint (s¯ = β1s′1+β2s′h)
does not go through the manifold range Mhh. The same is true for training subsidy policy: if the
disadvantaged group is too big, per capita training subsidies would be very small and would not
significantly change the dynamic structure of the model (eg. the Π˙1 surface does not shift up enough).
It is important to know that the mixed policies can be effective to mobilize the society to the pareto
dominant state Qhh, even when the majority group is disadvantaged. The mixed policy of integration
and quota system is depicted in Panel B2 of Figure 15. With the integration between groups, the
group state will moves closer to the center: X in Panel B1 to X ′ in Panel B2. Then, the straight line
from the position X may pass through the manifold range Mhh. Thus, this mixed policy helps the
majority group to move out of the trap. A bundle of three policy methods - integration, quota and
training subsidy - might be more effective in the implementation.
In the implementation of egalitarian policies, one important factor is the social consensus. Even
though an effective policy leads the economic state to the overlap ofMhh andMlh, the society may stay
at Qlh consistently if the pessimism prevails in the society and newborns are not motivated to improve
their skill investment rates. Therefore, the effective policy should come with the overturn of social
consensus. Forward looking decision making and the optimistic view toward the future are crucial
parts of the effective policy implementation. Another factor that can improve the effectiveness of
policy implementation is the fostering of within-group cooperation. Even though the social interaction
between two social groups cannot be proceeded significantly, it can be easier to improve the quality of
social interactions among the disadvantaged group members. If the quality of relationship is improved,
the lifetime benefits of investment increase: the slope f(σ1) gets steeper. We can check that the
manifold rangeMhh expands with the steeper f(σ1) in the given model. The fostering of within-group
cooperation can help the group move out the trap with the expanded folded overlap, when the proper
egalitarian policies are activated together. These two factors, the optimism in the society and the
within-group cooperation, can be facilitated by non-governmental institutions such as civic groups
and religious institutions, and by civic leaders who can motivate and integrate the disadvantaged
group members.
7 Macroeconomic Effects of Inequality
Human capital has been the prime engine of economic growth in the modern economy (Goldin and
Katz 2001, Abramovitz and David 2000). The accumulation of intangible capital contributed to
growth significantly, replacing the importance of physical capital accumulation in the early stage
of the Industrial Revolution (Galor and Moav 2004). Because inequality is greatly associated with
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overall human capital achievement, it is natural to think about the macroeconomic effects of inequality
(Benabu 1996). Along this line, Loury (1981) shows the positive effect of egalitarian policies on
overall economic activities, under the intergenerational transfer of skill achievement. Galor and Zeira
(1993) show the positive effect of equality on economic development, identifying the multiple equilibria
with the assumption of indivisible human capital investment. The credit market constraint is the
underlying force of the intergenerational mobility restriction in these studies. Unlike the previous
literature, I suggest the positive effect of equality on economic development without imposing the
assumption of credit market imperfection. Even in an economy with a perfect credit market, the
social network externalities still restrict the skill achievements of the disadvantaged groups. With more
equal distribution of social capital across social groups, the society can encourage more newborns from
disadvantaged groups to invest in skill acquisition, and reach a more developed stage of an economy.
Of course, social network externality is a broad concept that can include accessibility to physical
resources. For example, children of a rich community can afford the higher tuition for private schools
and tend to have a better quality of schooling. It is easier for college graduates of the rich community to
obtain the seed money for starting a business than those of the poor community. Therefore, in a society
with credit constraints, the social network externalities will be stronger, both during education period
and over the lifetime. However, the conclusion of the model sharply contrasts to the prediction of the
previous literature, which suggests an equal society in the matured economy where credit constraint
does not bind for the skill investment (Galor and Moav 2004), or an equal society with the centralized
provision of training (perfect public school system) (Loury 1981). Even in the sufficiently developed
economy with no binding of credit constraint or in the society with public provision of schooling, the
social network externalities over the skill acquisition period (such as peer effects, parental effects, role
models, and medical and nutritional provision) and over the working period (such as mentoring, job
search and business connections ) still influence the incentives for skill acquisition and work as a major
force of the intergenerational mobility constraint. Therefore, unlike the conclusions of the previous
studies, equality, namely more equal distribution of social network capital in this study, will have a
positive effect on the economic development even in the matured economy or in the society with a
perfect public school system.
7.1 Multiple Equilibria as Different Development Stages
In the developed model, we have four economically stable states, two symmetric ones and two asym-
metric ones. The two symmetric states, Qhh and Qll, indicate the most developed stage and the least
developed stage: s¯ = sh and s¯ = sl for each. Two asymmetric states indicate the mediocre levels
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of development with group 2’s better off (Qlh) and group 1’s better off (Qhl), which are defined as
network traps in the model: s¯ = β1s′l + β
2s′h and s¯ = β
1s′′h + β
2s′′l for each. When the economy
is trapped in either Qlh or Qhl, the egalitarian policies discussed in the previous section can help
society to be mobilized to the most developed stage of Qhh: integration or affirmative actions such
as training subsidies and quotas can be the tool to motivate more newborns of disadvantaged groups
to invest in skills. The structural change of the educational system or redistribution policy of income
can help the group to move out of the trap by mitigating the adverse effects of poor education period
network externalities, such as better public education system or more progressive tax system: with
this structural change, the folded overlap may expand covering the unequal steady state. Panel A
depicts the threshold level of economic development by the red line, above which egalitarian policies
can promote the economic growth helping the economic state move into the manifold range Mhh.
Below the threshold level, the policies may not be effective in the promotion of growth.
The development stages can be more than four in a multi-group economy. If the number of social
groups is n, the maximum number of economically stable state is 2n. Each of them can serve as a
development stage of an economy. The case of three group economy is displayed in Panel C of Figure
16. Maximum eight development stages are identified in a three dimensional Euclidian space with the
coordinates (s1, s2, s3), in which h (l) indicates the skill level of a group above (below) the medium skill
level sm. For example, (h, h, l) indicates group 1 and group 2 achieve the higher skill level while group
3 is left behind with the low skill acquisition rate. The following proposition analogous to Theorem 1
summarizes n group economy, denoting the integration level between group i and group j by ηij and
the average skill level of the two groups by s¯ij(t) ≡ β
isit+β
jsjt
βi+βj
:
Proposition 9 (N-Group Economy). In a n-group economy, the dynamic system with n flow variables
(s1t , ···, snt ) and n jumping variables (Π1t , ···,Πnt ) is summarized by the following 2n-variable differential
equations: s˙ti = α[1−G(A(σit,Πit))− sit]
Π˙it = (ρ+ α)
[
Πit − δ¯+f(σ
i
t)
ρ+α
]

i∈{1,2,···,n}
, (25)
where σit = (ηi1, ηi2, · · ·, ηin) · (s¯i1(t), s¯i2(t), · · ·, s¯in(t)), with ηij = ηji and
∑n
k=1 ηik = 1.
In this expanded (η, β) structure, the quality of social network of group i (σit) is an inner product
of two vectors, a vector of between-group integration levels and a vector of between-group average
skill levels. ηij = 1 indicates the perfect integration between group i and group j and their perfect
segregation from all other social groups. Then, the quality of the social network of group i is equal to
the average skill level between two groups: σit = s¯ij(t). ηij = 0 indicates zero contacts between the two
social groups. Then, the quality of the social network of group i is not affected by the group j’s skill
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level: ∂σ
i
t
∂sj(t)
= 0. In this dynamic system, there are maximum 3n steady states including maximum 2n
economically stable states. The stable manifold to each economically stable state is an n dimensional
manifold defined in 2n dimensional Euclidian space E2n. The manifold range of an economically stable
state is a projection of n dimensional stable manifold to n dimensional Euclidian space En with the
coordinates (s1, s2, · · ·, sn). Using the same notation rule defined in Notation 1, we have the following
implication for this economy.
Corollary 7. In an economy with n social groups, there are maximum 2n distinct development stages.
Qhh···h is the most developed stage and a pareto dominant steady state, and Qll···l is the least developed
stage and a pareto inferior steady state.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proofs for the two group economy at Corollary 3 and Theorem
2. ¥
This implies countries in the world might be in different development stages due to the different
social network structure. In order to understand how equalitarian policies can promote economic
development, check the following simple example: Suppose the initial economic state is (h, l, l) in
a three group economy. Group 1 is a sufficiently big group and those three social groups are fully
segregated. Suppose the initial state is in a deterministic range. Thus, the unequal state persists. If
the integration between group 1 and group 2 is facilitated, the economic state will move into the folded
overlap area of Mhll and Mhhl. As members of group 2 are motivated to increase the skill investment
rate, the economy will move toward the state (h, h, l). If the integration is between group 1 and group
3, the economic state will move toward (h, h, h), which is the most developed stage of the economy.
Thus, an egalitarian policy, integration, will help the economy grow. The case is roughly illustrated
in Panel C of Figure 16.
7.2 Positive Effect of Inequality
In most development stages, the egalitarian policies might facilitate the economic growth. However,
if the economy is in its early stage of development, the effect is obscure. As Panel A of Figure 16
describes, there is no way to enter Mhh if the economic state is positioned below the threshold level of
economic development depicted by the red line. Instead, there can be a positive effect of inequality,
consistent with Galor and Tsiddon (1997). Suppose the initial economic state is at Qll in a simple two
group economy. Also, suppose the government has resources to invest for human capital development
in the society, which might be borrowed from abroad or gained from selling natural resources. Panel
B of Figure 16 illustrates the resource constraint for human capital development. As far as two social
groups are separated significantly, the unequal distribution of development resources can be the best
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strategy for growth, because the unequal distribution may lead the skill composition into the manifold
range Mlh or Mhl, while the equal distribution is more likely to lead it into a deterministic range
of Qll. That is, when the resources are limited in the early stage of development, the concentration
of social capital to some selective groups can promote the groups to enhance their skill investment
rates significantly because they expect the increased return on skill achievement through the network
externality channel. This might explain the concentration of education facilities in selective cities in
many developing countries, rather than the equal distribution all over the countryside. The current
group inequality that exists in many less developed countries can be a byproduct of an initial economic
development promotion.
This positive effect of inequality in the early stage of development along with the positive effect of
equality in the later stage of development is consistent with the empirical findings that income tends
to be more equally distributed in developed countries than less developed countries and the early stage
of economic development often comes along with the growing inequality.
8 Application: Regional Group Inequality in South Korea
In this section, I present a historical example of between-group disparity - regional group disparity in
South Korea. The example displays how an initially advantaged group enhances its skill acquisition
activities by holding an optimistic view about the group’s network quality, and reinforces its dominant
position. Most social interactions in Korean society had occurred within each region (Youngnam,
Honam, Chungcheong, Kangwon, etc.) before the rapid urbanization in the last decades, as displayed
in Figure 17. Even after the urbanization, which caused a huge population to migrate to South Korea’s
main metropolis, Seoul, over the industrialization process, the regional based social interactions have
been the strongest in the social interactions among Seoul migrants through hometown gatherings,
high school alumni, or extended family reunions. Two regional groups, Youngnam and Honam, are
most distinguished due to their rivalry size and geographical separation by the Taebaek Mountains
that separate the peninsula.24 In the 1950s after the Korean war (1950-53), there was a negligible
difference between these two regional groups: both were poor and low skilled, as indicated by point
A in the skill composition map of Panel A of Figure 18. Over the next decades, the between-group
disparity has grown significantly: for example, among leaders in contemporary Korean society, 43.35%
were born in Youngnam and 21.88% were born in Honam.25 As Appendix Figure 3 demonstrates,
24According to the 1949 Census, Youngnam constituted 31.43%, Honam 25.24%, Metropolitan Area (Seoul and
Gyunggi) 20.69%, Chungcheong 15.73%, Kangwon 5.65% and Cheju 1.26% of the total population.
25Source: Chosun Daily Leaders’ Database in 2002 (www.dbchosun.com); Eui-Young Yu (2003). Note that these are
calculated excluding Seoul born leaders because Seoul natives (about 5% of the population) were exceptionally more
successful than migrants from the outskirts.
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members of the Youngnam are much more represented in most professions than those of the Honam.
The following explanations present the process of the group inequality evolution in the early stage of
economic development and the diminishing between-group inequality in the later stage of economic
development.
Emergence of Initial Group Disparity in the 1960s and 1970s
In the 1960s and 70s, the industrialization was strongly pushed forward by President Park’s ad-
ministration, whose regional origin was Youngnam. Ministerial officials from his native province,
Youngnam, were favored for the stability of the military regime (Ha 2007).26Youngnam-created com-
panies and businessmen took advantage of the social connections to the administration, while the
rivalry social group Honam, which was least connected to the administration, was most disadvan-
taged. In the early 80s, about half of the largest conglomerates were Youngnam-based, while only ten
percent of them were Honam-based.27 More Youngnam-born workers were hired by big companies
and promoted to the manager level using the social ties and connections. The Youngnam-dominating
circumstance led Honam group to be against the Park’s political party denoted by “Industrial party”,
and Youngnam group to be strongly supportive for the party as reflected in the presidential elections
since 1971 in Appendix Figure 4. The disparity emerged under the Park’s regime is described in Panel
B of Figure 18: denoting the skill levels of Honam and Youngnam groups by sh and sy respectively,
the state (sh, sy) moved from a low-skilled equal state A to a unequal state A′ in an overlap range of
Mll and Mlh.
Enhanced Human Capital Investment of the Youngnam Group since the Mid 1970s
Even after the assassination of President Park in 1979, the Youngnam based military regime
continued until the early 1990s. Youngnam-created business conglomerates were successful in the
global market. Members of the Youngnam maintained the optimistic view about the future that
the network quality of the group persistently improves over time. As the dynamic model of this
paper predicts, they enhanced human capital investment expecting the higher returns accrued over
their lifetimes. The college advancement rate in Figure 19 well reflects the enhanced skill investment
activities of young members of the Youngnam: since the late 70s, their college advancement rate
started to be significantly higher than other regional groups. It maintained 7 to 13 percent higher rate
than the national average in the 80s and 90s. More importantly, the higher college advancement rate
26Among ministerial officials between 1962 and 1984, excluding Seoul or North Korea born officials, 48.76% were born
in Youngnam while only 16.25% were born in Honam; Among CEOs of major banks, 52.63% were born in Youngnam
and 5.26% were born in Honam. (Hankook Daily 1/27/1989)
27Among the founders of the largest fifty conglomerates in 1985, 22 were born in Youngnam, four in Honam, twelve
in Seoul and Gyunggi, five in North Korea and seven in other regions (MH Kim 1991). The politically connected firms
are favored by lenders in the developing countries (Khwaja and Mian 2005).
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continued under the strictly equal provision of schooling in those days: since the late 70s, all private
secondary schools were merged into the public school system and the salary of the teachers became
identical across all secondary schools in the country.28 The evolution of skill composition (sh, sy) over
the period is described in Panel C of Figure 18. The members of the Youngnam significantly improved
skill investment rates with an optimistic view about the future, while those of the Honam continued
the lower skill investment activities with a pessimistic view.
Enhanced Human Capital Investment of the Honam Group since the Early 1990s
The situation started to change in the early 1990s. The first democratic regime took place in the
1992 presidential election and a Honam-born candidate was elected as the President for the first time in
the next election of 1997.29 Social integration between two regional groups proceeded over time. The
power transfer from Youngnam to Honam and the progressed social interaction between two regional
groups helped young members of the Honam to hold the optimistic view that the network quality of
the group will improve over time. They enhanced the skill investment activities expecting the higher
lifetime returns on the investment. Figure 19 demonstrates the highest level of college advancement
rate of Honam since 1994. The enhanced skill investment activities of Honam is described in Panel
D of Figure 18: the skill composition (sh, sy) was placed in an overlap range of Mlh and Mhh in the
early 1990s due to the integration effect and the power transfer to Honam. As members of the Honam
hold an optimistic view about the future, the skill composition (sh, sy) started to move toward the
high-skilled equal state (sh, sh).30
The dominating position of the Youngnam regional group helped the increased human capital
investment of the Korean economy in the 70s and 80s. Noting that the human capital accumulation
is a driving force of the economic development, the dominating position of a selective group provided
a positive effect on economic growth, which is consistent with what the given dynamic model suggests
for the early stage of economic development. The power transfer from one group to another group and
the more equally distributed social network capital helped another social group Honam to improve its
skill investment activities significantly. This promoted the further economic growth by the improved
human capital investment in the economy. Thus, as the model predicts, the equality has a positive
28Even more, over the same period, any type of private tutoring was prohibited by law. Also, students were randomly
assigned to the schools in most cities.
29As Appendix Figure 4 displays, a fraction of the original democratic party was merged into the industrial party in
1992, which had been led by President Park in the 70s. The democratic leader YS Kim, the candidate of the “new”
industrial party, competed against another democratic leader DJ Kim, the candidate of the democratic party, in the
1992 presidential election.
30The underclass of Seoul continue lower skill investment activities. It is plausible that they are trapped in the network
structure due to the urban poverty problem and the consequent low quality of education period network externalities.
This might persist in the future. It is noteworthy that a considerable percentage of the Seoul underclass are migrants
from Honam who moved in the 70s and 80s.
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effect on economic growth in the later stage of economic development.
9 Conclusion
This paper explores the dynamic structure of group inequality evolution through the channel of social
network externalities. The interaction of two kinds of network externalities, those operating during the
skill acquisition period and those at work over the course of a worker’s life, provides a unique dynamic
picture with folded overlaps and deterministic ranges. The former are the skill composition ranges
in which the mobilization force of lifetime network externality is most influential, and the latter are
ranges in which the historical force of education period network externality is most influential. Unequal
stable states in deterministic ranges are defined as network traps, in which a disadvantaged social group
cannot improve its skill investment rate without a governmental intervention or a structural change
of the economy. Egalitarian policies to mobilize the group out of the trap are examined. Any type
of egalitarian policy, integration, quota or training subsidies, can be effective in an economy with a
minority disadvantaged group. If the disadvantaged group is the majority, one policy alone cannot
solve the problem, but a combination of different policies may mobilize the group to change its skill
investment activities.
The dynamic model of the paper identifies multiple steady states of groups’ skill levels that can
be interpreted as different development stages, considering that the economic growth is driven by the
accumulation of human capital in the modern economy. The positive effect of egalitarian policies on
the economic development is discussed. When social network capital, the quality of social network, is
more equally distributed between social groups, more disadvantaged group members are motivated to
invest in their skills with the increased return on skill acquisition to accrue over their lifetime and, thus,
the economy grows. However, if the economy is in early stage of development, the unequal distribution
of social capital could be better for the economic growth to take off, because at least selective groups
are motivated to develop their skills even under the strong adverse effects of poor quality network
externalities over the skill acquisition period. This implies that unequal skill distribution between
social groups in many less developed countries might be the byproduct of an initial economic devel-
opment promotion. It is noteworthy that the macroeconomic effects of equality/inequality have been
examined even without imposing the standard assumption of an imperfect credit market. Therefore,
unlike the previous studies (Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993), the result implies a positive effect
of equality even in an economy where a credit constraint is not binding for the skill achievement, or
where public provision of education is well cultivated.
The theoretical framework in this paper is unique in terms of its dynamic structure with multiple
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overlaps. The folded overlaps and social consensus in the model are innovative ideas to deal with dis-
tinct social groups with different economic statuses and expectations toward the future. The concepts
can be applied to other research areas dealing with heterogeneous economic groups, such as trade
between nations and games between teams. Also, the rational expectation framework, combined with
an overlapping generation structure, provides a unique way to analyze the intergenerational social
mobility. A similar method is applied to my companion paper (Kim and Loury 2008) for the analysis
of the evolution of group reputation. Future research related to intergenerational social mobility may
adopt this method. Noting the importance of social networks to one’s economic success, the lack of
theoretical works along this line is awaiting research in the field of economics. The theoretical frame-
work suggested in this paper could be a good building block for more research on the social networks
and social capital.
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10 Appendix: Proofs
10.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Let us define a function sy(sx): sy ≡ 1 − G(A(sx, δ¯+f(sx)ρ+α )). Then, s′ and s′′ satisfy s′ > sy(s′) and
s′′ < sy(s′′), according to the given condition. Because A(0,
δ¯+f(0)
ρ+α ) < ∞, sy(0) > 0, which implies
that at least one steady state exists in (0, s′). Because A(1, δ¯+f(1)ρ+α ) > 0, sy(1) < 1, which implies
that at least one steady state exists in (s′′, 1). By the continuity of sy(sx), there must be at least one
steady state in (s′, s′′). QED.
10.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Using an implicit function theorem, we have the following result from equation (8) for any state on
the s˙ = 0 locus:
∂Π
∂s
∣∣∣
(s˙=0 locus )
= −1 +G
′A′s
G′A′Π
∣∣∣
(s˙=0 locus )
. (26)
From equation (9), we have the following result for any state on the Π˙ = 0 locus:
∂Π
∂s
∣∣∣
(Π˙=0 locus )
=
f ′
ρ+ α
∣∣∣
(Π˙=0 locus )
. (27)
From the demarcation loci described in Panel B of Figure 1, we know that the slope at the s˙ = 0 locus
is greater than that at the Π˙ = 0 locus at the steady states El and Eh, and the slope at the s˙ = 0
locus is smaller than that at the Π˙ = 0 at the steady state Em:
−1 +G
′A′s
G′A′Π
>
f ′
ρ+ α
(at El or Eh). (28)
−1 +G
′A′s
G′A′Π
<
f ′
ρ+ α
(at Em). (29)
Given the dynamic system in equation (7), its linearization around a steady state (s¯, Π¯) is
s˙t = α[−G′A′s − 1](st − s¯) + α[−G′A′Π](Πt − Π¯)
Π˙t = −f ′(st − s¯) + (ρ+ α)(Πt − Π¯).
Therefore, the Jacobian matrix JE evaluated at a steady state is
JE ≡
[
−αG′A′s − α −αG′A′Π
−f ′ ρ+ α
]
(s¯,Π¯)
.
Consequently, its transpose is trJE = −αG′A′s + ρ and the determinant is |JE | = −α(ρ+ α)(G′A′s +
1) − αf ′G′A′Π. Since trJE is positive, every steady state is unstable. |JE | is negative at El and Eh
because of equation (28), which implies that those are saddle points. |JE | is positive at Em because of
equation (29), which implies that Em is a source, either an unstable node or an unstable focus. QED.
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10.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose eo ≥ sm. This means that the saddle path to Eh intersects the Π˙ = 0 locus between sm and
sh. Let us denote the intersection point by C(sc,Πc), where sm ≤ sc < sh. Because it is on the Π˙ = 0
locus, Πc|Π˙=0 locus = δ¯+f(s
c)
ρ+α . Because it is on the saddle path to Eh,
Πc|saddle path =
∫ ∞
t
[δ¯ + f(sτ )]e−(ρ+α)(τ−t)dτ,
where st = sc, sτ > sc, ∀τ > t, and limτ→∞ sτ = sh. Therefore, we have
Πc|saddle path =
∫ ∞
t
[δ¯ + f(sc) + (f(sτ )− f(sc))]e−(ρ+λ)(τ−t)dτ
=
δ¯ + f(sc)
ρ+ α
+
∫ ∞
t
[f(sτ )− f(sc)]e−(ρ+λ)(τ−t)dτ. (30)
Then, Πc|saddle path > Πc|Π˙=0 locus because f(sτ )− f(sc) > 0,∀τ > t. This contradicts the assumption
that there exists an intersection of the locus and the saddle path between sm and sh. Therefore,
eo < sm.
In the same way, we can prove that ep > sm. Thus, a positive range of overlap [eo, ep] exists, where
eo < ep. Since two saddle paths in the overlap exist (one path to Eh, and the other path to El), the
social consensus determines the one to be taken. QED.
10.4 Proof of Proposition 3
[Optimistic Path] Above the two demarcation loci, the dynamic system is determined by
s˙t = α(1− st)
Π˙t = (ρ+ α)Πt − q1st − δ¯ − q0. (31)
In this dynamic system, two eigenvalues are −α and α+ρ and the steady state (s¯, Π¯)op is (1, δ¯+q0+q1ρ+α ).
Then, we have the explicit functions of st and Πt that satisfy the saddle path condition limτ→∞(st,Πt) =
(s¯, Π¯)op:
st = C∗e−αt +
δ¯ + q0 + q1
ρ+ α
Πt = C∗
ρ+ 2α
q1
e−αt + 1, (32)
where C∗ depends on the initial condition (s0,Π0) on the saddle path. Thus, we have the saddle path
that converges to Eh(1,
δ¯+q0+q1
ρ+α ): Π
op = q1ρ+2αs
op + (δ¯+q0)(ρ+2α)+q1α(ρ+α)(ρ+2α) .
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[Pessimistic Path] Under the two demarcation loci, the dynamic system is determined by
s˙t = −αst
Π˙t = (ρ+ α)Πt − q1st − δ¯ − q0. (33)
In this dynamic system, two eigenvalues are −α and α + ρ and the steady state (s¯, Π¯)pe is (0, δ¯+q0ρ+α ).
Then, we have the explicit functions of st and Πt that satisfy the saddle path condition limτ→∞(st,Πt) =
(s¯, Π¯)pe:
st = C∗e−αt +
δ¯ + q0
ρ+ α
Πt = C∗
ρ+ 2α
q1
e−αt, (34)
where C∗ depends on the initial condition (s0,Π0) on the saddle path. Thus, we have the saddle path
that converges to El(0,
δ¯+q0
ρ+α ): Π
pe = q1ρ+2αs
pe + δ¯+q0ρ+α .
10.5 Proof of Lemma 5
By the implicit function theorem imposed at equation (16), we have the following first order derivative:
d sj
d si∗
=
1
1− ki
[
1
−(G(A˜(σi∗))′ − k
i
]
. (35)
By assumption 1, there exists σˆ such that G(A˜(σ))′ is decreasing in [0, σˆ] and increasing in [σˆ, 1]. As
equation (16) implies, σi∗ is monotonically increasing with si∗. Therefore, d s
j
d si∗ is decreasing where
si∗ < 1 − G(A˜(σˆ)), and increasing where si∗ < 1 − G(A˜(σˆ)). Equivalently, Dj(si∗) is concave where
si∗ < 1−G(A˜(σˆ)), and convex where si∗ < 1−G(A˜(σˆ)). QED.
10.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Note that |Dj(si∗) − si∗| =
∣∣∣ A˜−1G−1(1−si∗)−si∗1−ki ∣∣∣ = |σi∗−si∗|1−ki , because si∗ = 1 − G(A˜(σi∗)). |σi∗ − si∗|
is fixed as Panel B of Figure 6 describes. The first derivative gives ∂|D
j(si∗)−si∗|
∂η =
|σi∗−si∗|
(1−βi)(1−η)2 .
Thus, |Dj(si∗) − si∗| shrinks as η increases. Also, it becomes larger with the bigger βi because
∂|Dj(si∗)−si∗|
∂βi
= |σ
i∗−si∗|
(1−βi)2(1−η) . Finally, let us denote the slope
∣∣∣∂(Dj(si∗)−si∗)∂si∗ ∣∣∣ by Q:
Q =
∣∣∣∣ 11− ki
[
1
−(G(A˜(σi∗))′ − k
i
]
− 1
∣∣∣∣ , because of equation (35).
=
1
1− ki
∣∣∣∣ 1−(G(A˜(σi∗))′ − 1
∣∣∣∣ . (36)
Then, the first derivative with respect to βi is ∂Q
∂βi
= 1
(1−βi)2(1−η)
∣∣∣ 1−(G(A˜(σi∗))′ − 1∣∣∣ . Thus, the slope is
steeper with the bigger βi. QED.
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10.7 Proof of Proposition 6
The total number of steady states is nine with η = 1, as discussed in section 5.1. By the dynamic
system in a homogeneous economy summarized in (7), the three states, (sl, sl), (sm, sm) and (sh, sh),
are steady states in a heterogeneous economy regardless of η and β1. For example, in the case of
(sh, sh), σ1 = σ2 = s1 = s2 = sh. They satisfy s˙1 = s˙2 = Π˙1 = Π˙1 = 0 in the dynamic system
summarized in Theorem 1. First of all, I claim that there are no symmetric steady states other than
those three. Suppose that a symmetric steady state (sˆ, sˆ) exists, which is not one of the three. Since
σ1 = σ2 = s1 = s2 = sˆ, this implies
s˙t
1 = α
[
1−G(A(sˆ,Π1t ))− sˆ
]
= 0
s˙t
2 = α
[
1−G(A(sˆ,Π2t ))− sˆ
]
= 0
Π˙1t = (ρ+ α)
[
Π1t −
δ¯ + f(sˆ)
ρ+ α
]
= 0
Π˙2t = (ρ+ α)
[
Π2t −
δ¯ + f(sˆ)
ρ+ α
]
= 0.
This contradicts that there are only three skill levels (sl, sm, sh) that satisfy formula (7). Therefore,
there are only three steady states regardless of η and β1.
Secondly, let us prove that the total number of steady states is three with η = 0. This is true
when there are no asymmetric steady states with η = 0. Suppose an asymmetric steady state (sˆ1, sˆ2)
exists, where sˆ1 6= sˆ2. Since two groups are fully integrated, σ1 = σ2 = s¯. Since it is a (global) steady
state, it should be a partial steady state. By equations (13) and (14), si∗ is uniquely determined by
σi∗, which implies that sˆ1=sˆ2 when σ1 = σ2. This contradicts that it is an asymmetric steady state.
Therefore, there is no asymmetric steady state when η = 0. Since there are only three symmetric
steady states, the number of steady states is three when two groups are fully integrated.
The total number of steady states monotonically decreases from nine to three as η declines, because
|Dj(si∗) − si∗| is monotonically decreasing as η declines (Lemma 6) and there is a unique inflection
point in the partial steady state loci (D2(s1∗) and D1(s2∗)) (Lemma 5). This implies the number of
steady states decreases from three to zero as η declines, in Regions 1 and 3, and there is always a
unique steady state in Regions 2 and 4. QED.
10.8 Proof of Corollary 2
The uniqueness of the steady states in Regions 2 and 4 is already proven in the proof of Proposition
6. Let us prove that all steady states satisfy σ1∗∗ < sm and σ2∗∗ > sm in Region 1. The distance
|Dj(si∗) − si∗| is monotonically decreasing as η declines (Lemma 6), which means the partial steady
state loci move closer to the diagonal as η declines. This implies that the following should hold: s1∗∗ <
sm and s2∗∗ > sm at any steady state (s1∗∗, s2∗∗) with η < 1. In Region 1, the partial steady state locus
s1∗(s2) is below the sm = k1s1∗ + (1− k1)s2 line, because (s1∗, σ1∗) must satisfy s1∗ = 1−G(A˜(σ1∗))
from equations (13) and (14), and, due to its monotonicity, σ1∗ < sm when s1∗ < sm. By the same
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reasoning, the partial steady state locus s2∗(s1) is above the sm = k2s2∗ + (1 − k2)s1 line, because
σ2∗ > sm when s2∗ > sm. Therefore, σ1∗∗ is smaller than sm because any steady state (s1∗∗, s2∗∗) in
Region 1 must be below the sm = k1s1∗ + (1− k1)s2 line. σ2∗∗ is greater than sm because the steady
state must be above the sm = k2s2∗ + (1− k2)s1 line.
Now, let us prove that σ1∗∗ > sl and σ2∗∗ < sh. Since the distance |Dj(si∗)− si∗| is monotonically
decreasing as η declines (Lemma 6), any steady state in Region 1 should satisfy the following two
conditions with η < 1: sl < s1∗∗ < sm and sm < s2∗∗ < sh. This implies that sl < σ1∗∗ < sh and
sl < σ
2∗∗ < sh. Therefore, we can conclude that sl < σ1∗∗(s1∗∗) < sm and sm < σ2∗∗(s2∗∗) < sh for
any steady state in Region 1 with η < 1 given. In the same way, we can prove that all steady states
satisfy sm < σ1∗∗(s1∗∗) < sh and sl < σ2∗∗(s2∗∗) < sm in Region 3. QED.
10.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Let us check the local stability at one steady state Qhh. We have the following Jacobian matrix at
the steady state Qhh(sh, sh,Πh,Πh):
JQhh =

α[−G′A′σ(η + (1− η)β1)− 1] α[−G′A′σ(1− η)β2] α[−G′A′Π] 0
α[−G′A′σ(1− η)β1] α[−G′A′σ(η + (1− η)β2)− 1] 0 α[−G′A′Π]
−f ′σ(η + (1− η)β1) −f ′σ(1− η)β2 ρ+ α 0
−f ′σ(1− η)β1 −f ′σ(η + (1− η)β2) 0 ρ+ α

Qhh
.
Let us denote JQhh −λI using 2× 2 matrices Jijs: JQhh −λI =
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
. We need to calculate the
determinant of JQhh−λI in order to find eigenvalues. Note that |JQhh−λI| ≡ |J22| · |J11−J12J−122 J21|.
Let us denote the second term by J ′: J ′ ≡ J11 − J12J−122 J21. Using the explicit forms of Jijs, J ′ is
J ′ = J11 −
[
α[−G′A′Π] 0
0 α[−G′A′Π]
]
·
[
(ρ+ α− λ)−1 0
0 (ρ+ α− λ)−1
]
·
[
−f ′σ(η + (1− η)β1) −f ′σ(1− η)β2
−f ′σ(1− η)β1 −f ′σ(η + (1− η)β2)
]
. (37)
Thus, its determinant is
|J ′| =
∣∣∣∣∣J11 − αξ
[
η + (1− η)β1 (1− η)β2
(1− η)β1 η + (1− η)β2
]∣∣∣∣∣ , where ξ = G′A′Πf ′σρ+ α− λ.
= [λ− α(−G′A′ση − 1) + αξη]·[λ− α(−G′A′σ − 1) + αξ]. (38)
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The result is achieved with a bit messy calculation. Therefore, we have the determinant of J− λI:
|JQhh − λI| = |J22| · [λ− α(−G′A′ση − 1) + αξη] · [λ− α(−G′A′σ − 1) + αξ]
= [λ2 − λ(−αG′A′σ + ρ)− α(α+ ρ)(G′A′σ + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′σ]Qhh
·[λ2 − λ(−αG′A′ση + ρ)− α(α+ ρ)(G′A′ση + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′ση]Qhh . (39)
Taking |JQhh − λI| = 0, we can obtain four eigenvalues at the steady state. First, note that [−α(α+
ρ)(G′A′σ + 1) − αG′A′Πf ′σ]Qhh < 0 by equation (28). Thus, the first term of the determinant has one
positive and one negative eigenvalue. That is, the local stability condition at Ehh in a homogeneous
economy implies one negative and one positive eigenvalue in a heterogeneous economy at Qhh. Also,
we have [−α(α+ ρ)(G′A′ση + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′ση]Qhh < 0 because −α(α+ ρ)(G′A′ση + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′ση =
η(−α(α+ ρ)(G′A′σ + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′σ)− α(α+ ρ)(1− η). Therefore, there are two positive eigenvalues
and two negative eigenvalues.
There exists a unique equilibrium path if the number of jumping variables equals the number of
eigenvalues with a positive real part (Buiter, 1984). Since we have two jumping variables, Π1t and Π
2
t ,
we know the existence of the unique equilibrium path in the neighborhood of (sh, sh). Therefore, Qhh
is an economically stable state. The four steady states Qll, Qhh, Qlh and Qhl are identical in terms of
their local dynamic structures, as manifested by local demarcation surfaces at those states. We can
conclude that those four steady states are economically stable states. Without loss of generality, we
can infer that two eigenvalues with a positive real part and two with a negative real part exist at those
states.
All other steady states, Qlm, Qmh, Qml, Qhm and Qmm, are economically unstable steady states.
For example, check the local stability of Qmm. Using equation (39), we have the determinant JQmm −
λI:
|JQmm − λI| = [λ2 − λ(−αG′A′σ + ρ)− α(α+ ρ)(G′A′σ + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′σ]Qmm
·[λ2 − λ(−αG′A′ση + ρ)− α(α+ ρ)(G′A′ση + 1)− αG′A′Πf ′ση]Qmm (40)
We know that [−α(α+ρ)(G′A′σ+1)−αG′A′Πf ′σ]Qmm > 0, by equation (29), and−αG′A′σ+ρ > 0 because
of A′σ < 0. Thus, the first term of the determinant implies two eigenvalues with positive real parts.
The second term implies at least one eigenvalue with positive real part because −αG′A′ση + ρ > 0.
Therefore, at least three eigenvalues have positive real parts. Since we have only two jumping variables,
we cannot always find a unique equilibrium path in the neighborhood of (sm, sm). Thus, Qmm is an
economically unstable state. Now check other states. Since all other four are identical in terms
of their dynamic structures, we need to check only one of them: Qmh. When η = 1, there must
be three eigenvalues with positive real parts and one negative eigenvalue, because group 1 is at an
economically unstable state Em and group 2 is at an economically stable state Eh in the separated
dynamic structures of two groups. Thus, Qmh is an economically unstable state since the number of
positive eigenvalues exceeds the number of jumping variables: except s1 = sm, there is no converging
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path to the state in the neighborhood of (sm, sh). We cannot explicitly calculate the signs of eigenvalues
with η < 1. However, the qualitative approach using demarcation surfaces identified in section 5.2.3
helps us to conclude that it cannot be an economically stable state for any η, because we can easily
find at least one point (s1, s2) in the neighborhood of (s′m, s′h), in which a converging equilibrium path
to Qmh(s′m, s′h) does not exist. QED.
10.10 Proof of Lemma 7
The given determinant equation is obtained in the proof of Theorem 2. Both R and ηR + (1 − η)ρ
are positive because A′σ < 1. Both H and ηH − (1 − η)α(α + ρ)] are negative at economically stable
states, Qll and Qhh, because of El and Eh are economically stable states in a homogeneous economy
and satisfy condition (28).
10.11 Proof of Corollary 4
At an economically stable state Qij , the linearized dynamic system is expressed with the Jacobian
matrix JQij : [
˙˜s(t)
˙˜Π(t)
]
=
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
][
s˜(t)
Π˜(t)
]
, (41)
where JQij =
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
, s˜(t) =
[
s1t − s1′
s2t − s2′
]
and Π˜(t) =
[
Π1t −Π1′
Π2t −Π2′
]
, in which Jij is 2× 2 matrix. Let
us define the expectation operator E with I(t), which is the information set conditioning expectations
formed at time t: for any vector x, Etx(τ) ≡ E(x(τ)|I(t)). This means that Etx(τ) is the expected
value x at time τ given the information set at time t. Let us define x˙(t) as x˙(t) ≡ limu→t x(u)−x(t)u−t .
Then, Etx˙(τ) = E
(
limu→τ
x(u)−x(τ)
u−τ
∣∣∣I(t)). Taking the expectation operator at both sides of the above
equation, we have [
Et ˙˜s(t)
Et
˙˜Π(t)
]
=
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
][
Ets˜(t)
EtΠ˜(t)
]
. (42)
Note that there are two positive eigenvalues and two negative eigenvalues at an economically sta-
ble state according to Theorem 2. Since they are distinct by assumption, there are four linearly
independent eigenvectors. Then, we have Jordan form with a diagonal matrix Λ:
JQij = BΛB−1, (43)
in which Λ =
[
Λ1 0
0 Λ2
]
with Λ1(Λ2) containing two negative (positive) eigenvalues, and the column
vectors of B are the corresponding eigenvectors. Let us partition B and B−1 into four 2× 2 matrices:
B =
[
W11 W12
W21 W22
]
and B−1 =
[
V11 V21
V12 V22
]
. Let us define two dimensional vectors p˜(t) and q˜(t) as
53
[
p˜(t)
q˜(t)
]
= B−1
[
s˜(t)
Π˜(t)
]
. Then, using the Jordan form, we have the following result.
[
Et ˙˜s(t)
Et
˙˜Π(t)
]
= BΛB−1
[
Ets˜(t)
EtΠ˜(t)
]
⇒
[
Et ˙˜p(t)
Et ˙˜q(t)
]
= Λ
[
Etp˜(t)
Etq˜(t)
]
. (44)
Therefore, we have Et ˙˜q(t) = Λ2Etq˜(t). This is true for any time τ ≥ t: Eτ ˙˜q(τ) = Λ2Eτ q˜(τ). Taking
the expectation operator Et at both sides, we have EtEτ ˙˜q(τ) = Λ2EtEτ q˜(τ). Note that, for any
random vectors u,v and w, E(E(u|v, w)|w) = E(u|w). Since I(τ) ⊇ I(t), we have the consequent
result,
Et ˙˜q(τ) = Λ2Etq˜(τ). (45)
This means that a forward looking individual’s expectation for time τ variation of q˜(τ), given infor-
mation set I(t), follow the above equation. An forward looking individual can expect q˜(τ) to be
Etq˜(τ) = eΛ2τK, ∀τ ≥ t, (46)
in which K is a two dimensional arbitrary constant. The forward looking “rational” individuals who
know that q˜(τ) should not explode over time will adjust their jumping variables (Π1t ,Π
2
t ) in order to
make Etq˜(∞) 6= ∞, which implies K = 0. This is a typical transversality condition. Therefore, we
have Etq˜(τ) = 0. This should be true for all τ ≥ t. We have
Etq˜(t) = 0⇒ V21s˜(t) + V22Π˜(t) = 0, (47)
because q(t) = V21s˜(t) + V22Π˜(t) and, for any vector x(t), Et(x(t)) = x(t). Therefore, we have
˙˜s(t) = J11s˜(t) + J12Π˜(t) (∵ equation (41))
= (J11 − J12V −122 V21)s˜(t) (∵ equation (47))
= (J11 + J12W21W−111 )s˜(t) (∵ BB−1 = I)
= (J11W11 + J12W21)W−111 s˜(t)
= W11Λ1W−111 s˜(t) (∵ JQijB = BΛ).
Therefore, we know how the skill composition evolves around an economically stable state given
(s10, s
2
0):
s˜(t) = eW11Λ1W
−1
11 (t−t0)s˜(t0)
= W11eΛ1(t−t0)W−111 s˜(t0). (48)
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The corresponding benefits of investments are
Π˜(t) = W21W−111 s˜(t) (∵ equation (47) and BB−1 = I)
= W21eΛ1(t−t0)W−111 s˜(t0). (49)
Applying s˜(t) =
[
s1t − s1′
s2t − s2′
]
and Π˜(t) =
[
Π1t −Π1′
Π2t −Π2′
]
,we have the unique equilibrium path given (s10, s
2
0)
in the neighborhood Qij :
s1t
s2t
Π1t
Π2t
 =
[
W11e
Λ1(t−t0)W−111
W21e
Λ1(t−t0)W−111
]
s1(t0)− s1′
s2(t0)− s2′
s1(t0)− s1′
s2(t0)− s2′
+

s1′
s2′
Π1′
Π2′
 .
QED.
10.12 Proof of Lemma 8
Note that, as integration proceeds, either Qlh and Qmh are merged together or Qlh and Qlm are merged
together before Qlh disappears. First, envision a threshold segregation level for a sufficiently small
β1′: ηˆ(β1′). With the threshold level, the D2(s1∗) curve will be tangent to the D1(s2∗) curve and
Qlh will be merged with Qmh, as Panel C of Figure 12 illustrates approximately. Now, let us increase
β1′ to β1′ + ² holding η = ηˆ(β1′). With this increase, D1(s2∗) moves away from a diagonal because
of the increased β1 and D2(s1∗) curve moves closer to the the diagonal because of the increased β2,
according to Lemma 6. Thus, two steady states, Qlh and Qmh, get more distant from each other. In
order to merge them and to make D2(s1∗) curve tangent to the D1(s2∗) curve, the lower segregation
level is required. Therefore, ηˆ(β1′) > ηˆ(β1′ + ²), which implies ηˆ(β1) is a strictly deceasing function
with the lower level of β1.
Now, imagine a threshold segregation level for a sufficiently great β1′′: ηˆ(β1′′). With this threshold
level, theD1(s2∗) curve will be tangent to theD2(s1∗) curve and Qlh will be merged with Qlm, as Panel
B-2 of Figure 15 illustrates approximately. Now, let us decrease β1′′ to β1′′ − ² holding η = ηˆ(β1′′).
With this decrease, D2(s1∗) moves away from a diagonal because of the increased β2 and the D1(s2∗)
curve moves closer to the the diagonal because of the decreased β1, according to Lemma 6. Thus, two
steady states, Qlh and Qlm, get more distant from each other. In order to merge them and to make
the D1(s2∗) curve tangent to the D2(s1∗) curve, the lower segregation level is required. Therefore,
ηˆ(β1′) > ηˆ(β1′ − ²), which implies ηˆ(β1) is a strictly increasing function with the higher level of β1.
Finally, imagine a group 1 population size of βˆ, with which all three steady states, Qlh, Qmh and
Qlm, are merged together at some level of segregation: ηˆ(βˆ). With an increase of β1 to βˆ+ ², D1(s2∗)
moves away from a diagonal and the D2(s1∗) curve moves close to the the diagonal, which means
only one steady state Qmh survives and the two others disappear. This implies the threshold level of
55
segregation should be higher with βˆ + ²: ηˆ(βˆ) < ηˆ(βˆ + ²). With a decrease of β1 to βˆ − ², D2(s1∗)
moves away from a diagonal and the D1(s2∗) curve moves closer to the the diagonal, which means
only one steady state Qlm survives and the two others disappear. This implies the threshold level of
segregation should be higher with βˆ − ²: ηˆ(βˆ) < ηˆ(βˆ − ²). Therefore, ηˆ(βˆ) is a local minima.
Therefore, with β1 ∈ (0, βˆ), Qlh and Qmh are merged at the threshold segregation level (before their
disappearance), and the threshold level ηˆ(β1) is a strictly decreasing function of β1. With β1 ∈ (βˆ, 1),
Qlh and Qlm are merged at the threshold segregation level, and the threshold level ηˆ(β1) is a strictly
increasing function of β1. QED.
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Figure 19. [Application] College Advancement Rate in Each Region
College Advancement Rate
• Source: Statistical Yearbook of Education (South Korea)
• The statistics rule out the vocational high schools. Note that an equalized public school system was
established in the mid 1970s. Before then, the Seoul’s college advancement rate was the highest because
the major prestigious private schools were located in Seoul.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Youngnam Honam Seoul Nation Wide
Youngnam’s Skill Advance Honam’s Skill Advance
st=0 st=1
πt
eo ep
Optimistic Equilibrium Path
Pessimistic Equilibrium Path
st=0
.
πt =0
.
Appendix Figure 1. Size of Overlap in a Simplified Homogeneous Economy
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- Segregation level η declines in Panel A, B, C, D, E, F order, with η=1 in Panel A and η=0 in Panel F.
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Appendix Figure 2. Manifold Ranges with No Lifetime Externalities
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Appendix Figure 3. Regional Group Disparity in S. Korea
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• Source: Chosun Daily Leaders’ Database www.dbchosun.com; Eui-Young Yu (2003)
• Rep index: Rep index is the ratio between leader's birthplace percentage in 2002 and newborn percentage
of the birthplace in 1970. The newborn distribution is a proxy of the regional distribution of young families in
1970. Rep index is calculated excluding Seoul born natives (about 5% of the population).
Appendix Figure 4. Regional Voting in Presidential Elections of S. Korea
Election Year 1963 1967 1971 1987
Parties Democratic Industrial Democratic Industrial Democratic Industrial Democrat 1 Democrat 2 Industrial
Candidates BS Yoon CH Park BS Yoon CH Park DJ Kim CH Park DJ Kim YS Kim TW Roh
Honam 41 59 52 48 64 36 88.4 1.2 9.9
Youngnam 36 64 27 73 25 75 5.0 41.6 48.8
Nationwide 49 51 45 55 46 54 27.1 28 38.6
Birthplace of 
Candidate Chungcheong Youngnam Chungcheong Youngnam Honam Youngnam Honam Youngnam Youngnam
Election Year 1992 1997 2002 2007
Parties Democratic Industrial Democratic Industrial Democratic Industrial Democratic Industrial
Candidates DJ Kim YS Kim DJ Kim HC Lee MH Roh HC Lee DY Jung MB Lee
Honam 91 4.2 93.5 3.8 92.5 5.4 79.5 9.0
Youngnam 10 98 12.3 58.4 24.5 70.3 9.1 62
Nationwide 33.8 42 40.3 38.7 48.9 46.6 26.1 48.7
Birthplace of 
Candidate Honam Youngnam Honam
North 
Korea Youngnam
North 
Korea Honam Youngnam
• Source: National Election Commission (South Korea )
• [Anecdote] The Democratic Party has been based on Honam region and the Industrial Party based on
Youngnam region since 1971 election. There was no presidential election between 1971 and 1987 due to
President Park’s dictatorship and the second military coup by President Chon in 1980. In 1987 election, the
democratic party was split into two. “Democratic 1” gave the candidacy to DJ Kim born in Honam, and
“Democratic 2” to YS Kim born in Youngnam. In 1992 election, the “Democratic 2” party was merged into the
Industrial Party and two democratic leaders, DJ Kim and YS Kim, competed for the presidency. In 1997 and
2002, the honam-based Democratic Party won the presidential elections.
